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Human Rights Reporting as Human Rights
Governance
MARGARET E. MCGUINNESS*
Contrary to the view that the rejection of human rights
treaty membership has left the United States outside the
formal international human rights system, the United
States has played a key role in international human
rights governance through congressionally mandated
human rights monitoring and reporting. Since the mid1970s, congressional oversight of human rights diplomacy, which requires reporting on global human rights
practices, has integrated international human rights
law and norms into the execution of U.S. foreign policy.
While the congressional human rights mandates have
drifted from their original purpose to condition allocation of foreign aid, they have effectively embedded international human rights norms and law into congressional decision-making and the operations of executive
branch agencies. Over the years, the reports issued
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finding, influencing the ways in which courts, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international
human rights institutions themselves interpret and apply human rights law. In this respect, congressional
human rights reporting mandates—not congressional
human rights treaty policy—have evolved as a driver of
U.S. engagement with and interpretation of the protections of international human rights law. This Article
draws on a variety of sources, including diplomatic
correspondence, interviews with government officials,
caselaw in domestic courts, and reporting by international human rights NGOs, to explore the effects of the
congressional human rights reporting mandates. It
demonstrates that what was designed as unilateral policy to enforce human rights has affected the construction of the U.S. human rights identity within the international system and the international human rights
system itself. Operating separately and in parallel to
targeted human rights sanctions legislation, the human
rights reporting mandates demonstrate the active and
effective participation of the United States in international human rights governance.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 366
II. CONGRESSIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MANDATES ............................ 374
A. From “Sense of Congress” to Binding Reporting
Obligations .................................................................... 377
B. Global Human Rights Monitoring and Reporting .......... 381
C. Embedding Human Rights Diplomacy in the Bureaucracy
...................................................................................... 388
D. The Internalization of International Human Rights Law 391
III. MONITORING AND REPORTING AS HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE
396
A. Monitoring and Reporting as Human Rights Fact-Finding
...................................................................................... 398
B. Human Rights Monitoring and Reporting as Opinio Juris
...................................................................................... 400
C. Accuracy and Politicization ........................................... 401
D. Monitoring and Reporting in International Lawmaking 404
E. Norm Integration Feedback Loop .................................. 407
IV. THE STICKINESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING ...................... 410

366

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[59:2

A. Not-so-“Cheap Talk” ..................................................... 412
B. Path Dependency and Reform ........................................ 415
C. Human Rights Diplomacy: An Agenda for Research ... 419
APPENDIX: ANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY ........................................ 422
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite its general rejection of full membership in human
rights treaties, the United States has played a leading role in international human rights governance through congressionally mandated human rights diplomacy. Since the adoption of the first congressional
human rights mandates (“CHRMs”) in the mid-1970s, congressional
requirements to monitor and report on global human rights practices
have served to integrate international human rights law and norms into
U.S. foreign policy. While these CHRMs have drifted from their original purpose to constrain executive branch discretion over the allocation of foreign aid, the mandates have effectively embedded international human rights norms and law into congressional decision-making
and the operations of the State Department and other executive branch
agencies. The annual Country Reports on Human Rights (“Country
Reports”) required by the mandates have grown to become a leading
international source of human rights fact-finding, influencing the ways
in which domestic and international courts, NGOs, and human rights
institutions interpret and apply human rights law. In this respect, congressional human rights reporting mandates—not congressional human rights treaty policy—have evolved as a central driver of U.S. engagement with and interpretation of the protections of international
human rights law. What was designed as unilateral policy to regulate
the human rights practices of aid-recipient states has constructed the
U.S. human rights identity within the international system and influenced the operation of the international human rights system itself.
Together with congressional and executive sanctions practices, the human rights reporting mandates form the legal basis for the active and
influential participation of the United States in international human
rights governance.1

1. Human rights sanctions practice, separate from human rights reporting practice,
remains a significant tool of U.S. human rights diplomacy and governance. This Article does
not address either the normative desirability of sanctions or the empirical effects of human
rights sanctions practice on state behavior.
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Congress has been viewed by many scholars as the central obstacle to full U.S. participation in the post-World War II international
human rights treaty system.2 And indeed, it is true that Congress has
been reluctant to subject U.S. domestic human rights behavior to international oversight through treaty membership; Congress even
threatened a constitutional amendment to keep the United States out of
human rights treaties.3 Yet, since the 1970s, Congress has been keenly
interested in the human rights behavior of foreign states, particularly
those which receive financial and military aid from the United States.
This interest in external human rights behavior, coupled with a desire
to constrain presidential foreign policy prerogatives in the wake of the
Vietnam War, led Congress to condition foreign military and humanitarian appropriations on respect for human rights. In the language of
the original statute, assistance would be prohibited to countries that
engaged “in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights,” unless the President requested a waiver.4
Congress sought to extend robust oversight of this provision, which
would claim for Congress a more direct role in presidential human
rights policy, by requiring the State Department to report annually on
human rights conditions in aid-recipient states. Preparation of the report required U.S. diplomats around the world to gather information
on whether and how foreign state behavior meets international human
rights standards.
The CHRMs have endured. Through them, the United States
continues to play an important role in international human rights governance in ways that tends to smooth differences between presidential
administrations.5 Since the 1970s, Congress has expanded the breadth
2. Critiques of Congress have largely focused on the Senate’s role in blocking treaty
participation and congressional concerns that domestic human rights practices would be
subject to international law. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 405, 421–22 (1979) (laying out the central objections posited in the 1970s for
U.S. membership in treaties, including attitudes in Congress, while making the case for the
joining); Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights
Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 68 (1990); Richard B. Bilder, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign
Policy: Short-Term Prospects, 14 VA. J. INT’L L. 597, 605–06 (1974); DAVID L. SLOSS, THE
DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 208, 221 (2016).
3. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 347–49 (1995).
4. See infra Part II.
5. The influence of the CHRMs has endured throughout the Trump administration,
notwithstanding the recent withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations Human
Rights Council and the Trump administration’s hostility toward the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”). See Susan Hannah Allen & Martin S. Edwards, The U.S. Withdrew from the
U.N. Human Rights Council. That’s Not How the Council Was Supposed to Work, WASH.
POST (June 26, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
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of the annual reporting requirements to include reports on human
rights conditions in all foreign states, not just those receiving U.S. aid.6
And it has expanded the depth and scope of human rights practices
covered by the reports to include a long list of rights that reflect the
growth of international human rights law over the past decades.7 In
addition to the annual Country Reports, the State Department is also
now required to prepare separate annual reports on religious freedom,
sex trafficking, and democracy promotion programs.8 Congress has
steadily added reporting requirements; it has never eliminated or reduced them.9 Over a time period that witnessed the broadening and
deepening of the international human rights system, CHRMs have enmeshed the United States within international human rights governance—even as the United States remains formally outside the jurisdiction of the central human rights treaties.
Congressional human rights policy, therefore, embodies a paradox of the American human rights tradition: the United States sees
itself as the champion of basic human rights around the world, while
simultaneously believing its own constitutional traditions make it special, both exempt from and outside the reach of international human
rights standards and enforcement.10 Louis Henkin famously described
cage/wp/2018/06/26/the-u-s-withdrew-from-the-u-n-human-rights-council-thats-not-howthe-council-was-supposed-to-work/ [https://perma.cc/2QJQ-UN27]; Max Boot, Trump Joins
the World’s Worst Human Rights Violators in Waging War on the ICC, WASH. POST (Sept.
14, 2020, 12:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/14/trump-joinsworlds-worst-human-rights-violators-waging-war-icc/ [https://perma.cc/UZ5W-DJQH]. The
full scope of the effects of the Trump administration’s additional rhetorical weakening of U.S.
human rights policy is worth future examination.
6. See infra Section II.B.
7. See id.
8. See infra Appendix.
9. Congress also created a congressional-executive agency, the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, which is intended to serve as a check on State Department
reporting by its preparation of a competing annual report on religious freedom. See discussion
infra Part II.
10. Andrew Moravcsik has called the ways in which the United States promotes human
rights for others but resists international evaluation of its behavior at home (framed as
exceptional constitutional values) “the paradox of American Exceptionalism.” He argues that
it is rooted in peculiar American notions about the source of legitimacy of rights but is also a
result of deep ambivalence and unilateralism on the question of human rights in foreign policy.
Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167–76 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). Michael
Ignatieff argues that “exceptionalism” has two types: (1) “exemptionalism,” the process
through which the United States exempts itself from international human rights treaty
oversight; and (2) “double standards,” whereby the United States judges foreign states’
behavior by different standards than those it applies to itself. Michael Ignatieff, Introduction:
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this through the metaphor of the cathedral of human rights: the United
States provides the external “flying buttresses” in support of the structure, but acts as an outside critic of other states; it does not enter and
engage in the activities within the cathedral or subject itself to its rituals.11 As a result, some scholars simply assume that by remaining outside of the binding force of treaties, the United States has effectively
closed itself off from the formal influences of international human
rights law in foreign policy, just as it has closed off human rights treaty
law from domestic rights jurisprudence.12
This picture of American human rights exceptionalism, which
captures only formal treaty commitments at the federal level, becomes
less sharply defined when viewed through a more expansive lens. Domestically, for example, external human rights developments have affected attitudes and lawmaking at the local and state level, which in
some cases steps in to fill the gap created by the absence of national
commitments to human rights treaties.13 Internationally, formal commitments to international governance in areas outside of human rights
treaties have been transformed through international human rights
norms, which are diffused throughout those legal and political processes.14
American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 1, 4, 7.

AND

HUMAN

11. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 421. Henkin summarized the dilemma: “But the United
States has not been a pillar of human rights, only a ‘flying buttress’—supporting them from
the outside. Human rights have been a kind of ‘white man’s burden’; international human
rights have been ‘for export only.’ Congress has invoked international human rights standards
only as a basis for sanctions against other countries. President Carter has invoked human
rights agreements in criticism of others.” Id.
12. For an example of the view that the decision of the United States to remain outside
human rights treaties leaves it unaffected by external international human rights norms, see
generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
For a view that the closing off of constitutional jurisprudence from international human rights
is detrimental to U.S. interests, see MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY:
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 250–51 (2019).
13. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 245, 245–46
(2001); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1641–42 (2006); Risa E. Kaufman,
State and Local Commissions as Sites for Domestic Human Rights Implementation, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM 89, 89 (Shareen Hertel & Kathryn
Libal eds., 2011).
14. See Kathryn Sikkink, A Typology of Relations Between Social Movements and
International Institutions, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 301, 302 (2003). See also RUTI G.
TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 165–92 (2011). See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR
HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2017).
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The seeming hypocrisy of American human rights policy—
pressing other states to live up to international human rights standards
while rejecting those standards as a measure for its own behavior—is,
in fact, a central feature of that policy. Congressional legislative mandates over executive branch human rights reporting operate to manage
and channel that hypocrisy. The four-decade legacy of the mandates
provides a counterexample to Harold Koh’s famous formulation that
“the president almost always seems to win in foreign affairs.”15 Congress, it seems, has actually “won” the battle for control of U.S. international human rights policy.16 The deeply entrenched regime of congressional human rights oversight has forced human rights
considerations onto the foreign policy agenda.17 Even in cases where
national security ultimately trumps human rights in a decision to allocate military or humanitarian assistance, presidents are no longer free
to ignore the human rights dimension of bilateral and multilateral relationships.18 This fact was evident in bipartisan congressional
pushback against retreats from human rights policy during the Trump
administration.19
Perhaps more important than their effect on congressionalpresidential debates over the direction of foreign policy, the congressional human rights mandates have entrenched the norms and institutions of international human rights law and governance within the
15. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988). See also
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 123 (1990) (describing congressional acquiescence and bad drafting as
explanations for weak congressional oversight in foreign affairs). This formulation may seem
particularly ironic, since Koh would go on to serve as the Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, a position created by congressional legislation. See
U.S. Dep’t State, Assistant Secretaries of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/12258.htm [https://perma.cc/975F-VBEH].
16. This is the case notwithstanding the ability of the President to waive human rights
conditionality under the general legislation. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Congressional
Enforcement of International Human Rights, 44 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 9, 10–11 (2020)
(discussing congressional moves to limit presidential discretion through sanctions and
individualized reporting).
17. Rebecca Ingber refers to these kinds of congressional mandates as “process controls”
through which Congress mandates institutional design as an indirect mechanism of foreign
policy. Rebecca Ingber, Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs, 106 VA. L. REV.
395, 400, 415–19 (2020).
18. Indeed, as the universal default sanctions regime failed to prevent aid to rightsabusing governments, Congress placed more targeted conditions linked to human rights
performance and the rule of law. Today, targeted, country-specific conditions are the norm in
almost every large bilateral aid and military assistance relationship. See infra Section II.B.
19. See McGuinness, supra note 16, at 11–12.
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executive branch. International human rights governance is a series of
decentralized processes of norm creation, elaboration, and enforcement. It is made up of interconnected political and legal institutions,
treaty bodies, courts, and commissions, which interact with states,
NGOs, corporations, and individuals in polycentric processes.20 The
polycentric nature of human rights governance allows multiple entry
points for official U.S. federal government participation⎯through the
executive branch, the courts, and Congress⎯in the full range of international human rights governance. The process of compliance with
CHRMs has fundamentally altered the methods through which the executive branch carries out diplomacy, expanding the work of diplomats
to include coordination and cooperation with human rights NGOs and
other members of civil society, and with courts and other consumers
of human rights reporting. The CHRM process has, therefore, created
a dynamic policy feedback cycle among the State Department, Congress, and civil society, which has informed the continual expansion
of the breadth and depth of human rights reporting requirements.21
This process serves as an alternative mechanism to treaty membership.22 Through the CHRM process, the U.S. influences, and is influenced by, the development of international human rights law in regional and international human rights systems.
In more recent years, international human rights institutions—
particularly the UN Human Rights Council—have expanded self-reporting requirements for member states, including by those, like the
United States, that are not party to international human rights treaty
20. See John Gerard Ruggie, Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”:
Lessons from Business and Human Rights, 20 GLOB. GOVERNANCE: REV. MULTILATERALISM
& INT’L ORGS. 5, 11–12 (2014).
21. See infra Section IV.E.
22. The U.S. is a party to only three of the major international human rights treaties: the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”). U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Feb. 4, 1985, 85 U.N.T.S. 1465; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1866, 660 U.N.T.S. 195;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 171 U.N.T.S. 999. While
membership in the CAT, CERD, and ICCPR requires self-reporting about compliance with
those treaties, the effect of the U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations is to render
the treaties international obligations of the United States, but with no domestic legal effect.
For a discussion of self-reporting under human rights treaties, see Cosette D. Creamer & Beth
A. Simmons, The Proof Is in the Process: Self-Reporting Under International Human Rights
Treaties, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2020) (finding self-reporting has been expanded in recent
years and noting four mechanisms for explaining why self-reporting may improve domestic
rights practices: elite socialization, learning and capacity building, domestic mobilization, and
law development).
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adjudicatory mechanisms.23 In these “self-reports” on domestic human rights practices prepared by the executive branch, we can see the
influence of these embedded human rights norms, as the U.S. government mediates between the language of American constitutional human rights exceptionalism and international human rights.24 The internalization of human rights norms was evident even in the Trump
administration, whose policy was to de-emphasize human rights in its
foreign policy rhetoric and behavior.25
Significantly, the content of the human rights reports has affected the ways in which agencies, courts, other human rights institutions, and members of civil society have assessed and adjudicated human rights claims and elaborated the scope and subject matter of
international human rights law.26 Taken together, these trends demonstrate how the embedding of international human rights norms in the
federal government, through dynamic congressional control of executive branch human rights reporting, has brought the United States inside the cathedral of human rights as a major driver of international
human rights governance.
This Article provides a positive theory of U.S. participation in
international human rights governance through human rights diplomacy. It focuses on the monitoring and reporting requirements of the
CHRMs and the dissemination of the annual Country Reports as the
central processes through which that diplomacy is carried out. The
Article draws on primary sources, including: diplomatic cables and
discussions with senior State Department officials; reported caselaw in
23. The UN Human Rights Council UPR requirement was passed as a General Assembly
Resolution creating the new Council. See G.A. Res. 60/251 (Mar. 16, 2006). See also PHILIP
ALSTON & SARAH KNUCKEY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING 3–4
(2016).
24. See, e.g., United States, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph
5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/WG.6/36/USA/1 (Aug. 13, 2020); United States, Fourth Periodic Report of the
United States of America to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights Concerning the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/4 (May 22,
2012); United States, Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations
Committee Against Torture (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Reports), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/3-5
(Dec. 4, 2013); United States, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of
the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/22/USA/1
(Feb. 13, 2015).
25. However, as I have argued elsewhere, the Trump administration’s absence of
rhetoric in support of human rights in foreign policy had corrosive effects. See Margaret E.
McGuinness, Presidential Human Rights Talk, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 473–74 (2017). See
also discussion infra Section IV.B.
26. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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U.S., foreign, and international courts; opinions of international human
rights treaty bodies and institutions; and reporting of human rights
NGOs. It draws on these empirical data to illustrate the ways in which
the mechanisms of U.S. human rights diplomacy influence legal processes and determinations of human rights claims in a variety of adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory settings. In this way, this Article seeks
to contribute to the empirical turn in international law scholarship,
which is concerned with “the conditions under which international law
is formed and has effects”27 and examines how international law is
created by “specific forces and factors”28 and “accomplishes its ends
under particular conditions.”29
This examination of U.S. human rights reporting contributes to
our understandings of sources of international human rights law, both
treaties and customary international law. It illustrates the dynamic process through which human rights monitoring and reporting applies and
interprets the foundational non-binding declarations and treaties that
construct international human rights law. It further illustrates that
monitoring and reporting serve as a form of state practice and expression of opinio juris for purposes of determining customary international human rights law. The Article demonstrates that, under certain
institutional conditions, what is frequently dismissed as a state’s unilateral human rights policy operates as a form of international human
rights governance. Therefore, this Article also contributes to the burgeoning cross-disciplinary literature in political science and law that
seeks to understand how and under what circumstances states engage
or reject engagement with the international human rights system.30
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the legislative architecture of the human rights reporting mandates and explains
the ways in which Congress exercised its appropriations power to create U.S. human rights diplomacy and incorporate emerging international human rights standards into U.S. law. Part III draws on primary
sources to assess the effects of human rights reporting on human rights
law and governance. It argues that widespread citation to the Country
Reports in adjudication before domestic agencies and courts, before
foreign courts, and in UN and NGO reporting, demonstrates the transformation of internal foreign policy oversight statutes into global human rights monitoring and reporting with influence on the interpretation and elaboration of human rights law. Part IV examines why the
27. Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 67–85 (2013).
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CHRMs have endured, draws some preliminary conclusions about the
future of the congressional reporting mandates, and suggests avenues
of future research at the intersection of human rights law and diplomacy that might enrich our understanding of how human rights governance works.
The viability of the international human rights system is threatened when states retreat from the rhetorical, normative, and legal commitments to human rights. While this Article focuses on the congressional mandates and the Country Reports, U.S. participation in human
rights governance is influenced by other factors, including U.S. membership in international human rights institutions (including, yes, human rights treaties), unilateral and multilateral sanctions practices, and
engagement with international human rights norms integrated into
other areas of international law.
The Trump administration’s retreat from human rights diplomacy, together with the rise of other nationalist challenges to international human rights governance, has prompted fundamental reassessment of the future of the human rights project and the United States’
role in it. This Article suggests that any discussions of reform or reconception of the international human rights system⎯and the future
of the United States in that system⎯must take into account the role of
human rights monitoring and diplomacy in human rights governance.
II. CONGRESSIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MANDATES
In U.S. constitutional law, the President, more by historical
practice than by explicit design, “almost invariably wins in foreign affairs.”31 But Congress wields influence over the foreign policy agenda
in two ways: the treaty power and coercive use of the power of the
purse. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Senate effectively
wielded the treaty power to thwart presidential efforts to commit the
United States to the emerging international governance system. Despite President Wilson’s strong support for the creation of the League
of Nations and for U.S. membership therein, Congress blocked U.S.
participation in the League of Nations.32 Following World War II,

31. See KOH, supra note 15, at 117. See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 35–45 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the ways in which the paucity
of textual conferrals of presidential foreign affairs power in the Constitution itself has been
expanded on as American global power has grown).
32. See OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A
RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 309–51 (2019); Leroy G. Dorsey,
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congressional leadership consolidated opposition to joining the nascent UN human rights system, arguing that the UN was an illegitimate
outside arbiter of U.S. human rights behavior.33 Congress even threatened a constitutional amendment to prevent the federal government
from imposing international human rights standards on the states.34
When the two central international human rights covenants⎯the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”)⎯were completed in 1966, congressional opposition to
treaty membership was entrenched.35 When the United States did later
join the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(“CERD”), it was with reservations rendering those treaties non-selfexecuting as domestic law, a condition that was required to achieve
Senate approval for ratification.36 In 2012, the U.S. Senate voted
against adopting the Convention of Rights for Persons with

Woodrow Wilson’s Fight for the League of Nations: A Reexamination, 2 RHETORIC & PUB.
AFF. 107, 110–16 (1999).
33. Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights U.S. Policy and Priorities
Symposium: Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, 14 VA. J. INT’L L. 611, 612–
14, 618–19 (1974). As historian Carol Anderson has chronicled, this opposition was at least
in part driven by anti-communist fervor and institutional racism. See generally CAROL
ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955 (2003).
34. ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 220; SLOSS, supra note 2, at 201–08, 248–53
(explaining conservative reaction within Congress and the American Bar Association to the
UN Human Rights Commission and its role in drafting the human rights covenants, including
the proposed Bricker amendments, which were designed to block U.S. membership in any
human rights treaties).
35. For a full discussion, see BARBARA J. KEYS, RECLAIMING AMERICAN VIRTUE: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION OF THE 1970S, at 27 (2014); Louis Henkin, Human Rights:
Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM
INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 3, 15, 19 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison, eds., 2000).
36. For the Senate ratification of the CAT, see S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1990),
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/100th-,congress/20/resolution-text
[https://perma.cc/4BJU-2CMK]. For the Senate ratification of the ICCPR, see S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 95-20 (1992), https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/95th-congress/20/
resolution-text [https://perma.cc/577S-YPJP]. For the Senate ratification of the CERD, see S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18 (1994), https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/95th-congress/
18/resolution-text?r=14&s=1 [https://perma.cc/YCJ3-97QS]. See also Henkin, supra note 35,
at 19 n.32 (discussing the adoption of the ICCPR with reservations, understandings, and
declarations).
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Disabilities (“CRPD”).37 It joins several other human rights instruments the United States has signed but not ratified that remain stalled
because of congressional opposition.38 Congress has been effective in
preventing presidents who seek full, formal membership in the international human rights treaty system from achieving it.
But Congress has not been hostile to international human rights
law when it comes to judging other states. At the beginning of the
1970s, President Nixon and his national security team followed a foreign policy that was openly and explicitly hostile to both the idea of
human rights treaty membership for the United States and of conditioning relationships with other states on the protection of human
rights.39 Congress pushed back to place human rights at the center of
foreign policy.40 While Congress continued to be uninterested in having the world judge U.S. practices by international standards, it was
concerned that U.S. funds were being used aggressively to support
egregious human rights abusers around the world. The revelations of
the secret bombings of Cambodia, the heavy-handed involvement of
the United States in South America (in particular the 1973 military
coup in Chile), and the general U.S. support (financial and in the form
of military sales and training) of regimes engaging in widespread human rights violations prompted Congress to tighten its controls over
how the executive branch spent foreign aid and military assistance.41
The shift toward aggressive congressional oversight has been characterized as “spurred by the American civil rights movement, the
37. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Dole Appears, but G.O.P. Rejects a Disabilities Treaty,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www nytimes.com/2012/12/05/us/despite-doles-wish-goprejects-disabilities-treaty.html [https://perma.cc/JL54-WCYF].
38. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)
was signed by Carter, but is not yet ratified; likewise, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (“CRC”) was signed in 1995, but has not yet been ratified. For a summary of
congressional resistance to presidential efforts to adopt human rights treaties, see Moravcsik,
supra note 10, at 185.
39. KEYS, supra note 35, at 132–33; SARAH B. SNYDER, FROM SELMA TO MOSCOW: HOW
HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS TRANSFORMED U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 30–33 (2018); Daniel
Sargent, Oasis in the Desert?:
America’s Human Rights Rediscovery, in THE
BREAKTHROUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 1970S, at 134 (Jan Eckel & Samuel Moyn eds., 2014).
40. This was part of a broader congressional effort to curtail presidential power in the
wake of Watergate and the Vietnam War. The War Powers Act was adopted around the same
time. See HENKIN, supra note 31, at 85–86. For excellent histories on the origins of
congressional human rights activism, see KEYS, supra note 35, at 132–33; SNYDER, supra note
39, at 30–33. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S.
LEADERSHIP, H.R. REP. NO. 29-692 (1974) [hereinafter FRASER REPORT].
41. SNYDER, supra note 39, at 6. See Judith Innes de Neufville, Human Rights Reporting
as a Policy Tool: An Examination of the State Department Country Reports, 8 HUM. RTS. Q.
681, 683 (1986).
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backlash against American involvement in Vietnam, and disenchantment with the amoral character of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford foreign
policy.”42 The result of Congress’s renewed interest in human rights
was the passage of legislation linking the human rights practices of
foreign nations to U.S. foreign policy.43 Those statutes included requirements to restructure the processes of American diplomacy in an
effort to affect the methods and means, if not the ends, of U.S. foreign
policy.44 As described below, the statutory architecture broadened and
deepened over time, adding specificity to the content and nature of the
rights to be monitored and expanding the covered states to include
those not receiving aid.45 This was the result of an iterative process⎯a
policy feedback loop through which Congress and the executive acted
and reacted to one another’s initiatives or retrenchment on human
rights.46 Over forty years, a process that began with a non-binding
“sense of Congress” has grown into an edifice of international human
rights governance within the U.S. government. It includes executive
branch offices tasked with ongoing monitoring and reporting of human
rights in conversation with NGOs, domestic and international courts,
and treaty bodies. And it is more deeply entrenched into U.S. foreign
policy than the original statutory architects could have imagined.47
A. From “Sense of Congress” to Binding Reporting Obligations
In 1961, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act
(“FAA”)48 with the stated purpose “to help strengthen the forces of
42. David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric
and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205, 206 n.2 (1985).
43. David Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 231, 246–51 (1977) (discussing the human rights legislation passed between
1973 and 1976). See also David L. Cingranelli & Thomas E. Pasquarello, Human Rights
Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries, 29 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 539, 539 (1985) (citing RICHARD B. LILLICH, U.S. LEGISLATION RELATING HUMAN
RIGHTS TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1979)). See also infra Section II.B.
44. See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 119 (1987) (describing how Congress tried to get at human rights “substance
of the matter through procedure”). See also Ingber, supra note 17, at 415–419.
45. See infra Section II.C.
46. See infra Section II.A–B.
47. SNYDER, supra note 39, at 123. One of those architects was Congressman Donald
Fraser, who led the committee that in 1974 set out an ambitious plan for incorporating
international human rights into U.S. foreign policy. See generally FRASER REPORT, supra note
40.
48. Pub. L. No. 87-195.
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freedom by aiding peoples of less developed friendly countries of the
world to develop their resources and improve their living standards, to
realize their aspirations for justice, education, dignity, and respect as
individual human beings, and to establish responsible governments.”49
As originally drafted, the FAA did not contain any specific restraints
on assistance; it did not link the provision of aid to foreign states to
human rights, nor did it require reports on the human rights practices
of aid recipients.50
In December 1974, Congress amended the FAA with the following “sense of Congress”:
It is the sense of Congress that, except in extraordinary
circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce
or terminate security assistance to any government
which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without
charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life,
liberty, and the security of the person.51
Although not binding as a matter of law, the provision did stipulate
that the President “shall advise the Congress of the extraordinary circumstances necessitating the assistance.”52 That same year, another
“sense of Congress” resolution expanded the policy suggestion to terminate civilian humanitarian assistance to countries which engage in a
“consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.”53
These congressional policy suggestions were met with hostility
from the Ford administration. A November 1975 report from the administration to Congress stated that neither U.S. interests nor human
rights would be served by “public obloquy” which “impaired relations
with . . . recipient countries.”54 The report also stressed the difficulty
49. 22 U.S.C § 2151 (1961).
50. Pub. L. No. 93-559 (1974).
51. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1974) (enacted as Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-559 § 46) (emphasis added).
52. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1974).
53. 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-559 § 502B, 88 Stat. 1815 (1974)
(emphasis added).
54. U.S. DEP’T STATE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN
COUNTRIES RECEIVING U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE (1975), reprinted in Foreign Assistance
Authorization Arms Sales Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of
the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 94th Cong. 378 (1976).
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in making distinctions among nations because human rights violations
are widespread and often unrecorded.55 The President and State Department argued forcefully⎯consistent with Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger’s view that morality and moralizing should play no role in
foreign policy⎯that U.S. concerns about human rights behavior in foreign states should be left to diplomatic discretion, and that Congress
should not tie the hands of diplomats who are required to balance a
range of U.S. interests in a particular country.56
Congress responded to this executive branch resistance by
making the human rights conditions on foreign and military assistance
legally binding. In December 1975, Congress passed the International
Development and Food Assistance Act (“IDFA”), which contained the
following explicit condition: “No assistance may be provided under
this subchapter [International Development] to the government of any
country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights . . . unless such assistance
will directly benefit the needy people in such country.”57 This provision also stated that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations or the
House Committee on International Relations could require the submission of “information demonstrating that such assistance will directly
benefit the needy people in such country, together with a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided.”58 If either the House or
Senate disagreed with the President’s justification, “it may initiate action to terminate assistance.”59 The statute also required the executive
branch to submit annually a “full and complete report regarding the
steps [the President] has taken to” carry out the provisions of this section.60
Restrictions on security assistance were also codified through
the new International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act (“ISA”), in June 1976. The Senate amendment to the House ISA
bill contained four principal provisions, which were adopted at the
committee of conference and passed as law.61 The first was a
55. Id.
56. See Bilder, supra note 2, at 598. See also SNYDER, supra note 39, at 30; KEYS, supra
note 35, at 132; John Shattuck, Diplomacy with a Cause: Human Rights in U.S. Foreign
Policy, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 272–73.
57. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1975) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 94-161, Title III § 310)
(emphasis added).
58. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(b) (1975).
59. Id.
60. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(6) (1975).
61. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1272 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-329 § 310).
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statement that “a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human
rights,” and accordingly that “no security assistance [shall] be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of human rights.”62 Second, the Act established a new position of Coordinator of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at the Department of State.63 Third, it allowed termination, restriction, or continuation of assistance by joint resolution of
Congress.64 Fourth, it required that “the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress . . . a full and complete report, prepared with the
assistance of the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to practices regarding the observation of and respect
for internationally recognized human rights in each country proposed
as a recipient of security assistance.”65 Congress received the first report from the State Department, as required by the ISA, in early 1977,
reflecting information that was current through the end of 1976.66
In August 1977, Congress amended the IDFA to require that
human rights reports be prepared on all countries receiving development assistance.67 The reports under the IDFA were to contain not
only “the status of internationally recognized human rights” in each
country but also “the steps the Administrator [of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (“USAID”)] has taken to alter United
States programs under subchapter 1 [International Development] of
this chapter in any country because of human rights considerations.”68
By the end of 1977, Congress had thus placed restraints on both security and development assistance based on human rights practice and
had created the annual Country Reports as a means of overseeing the
policy. Jimmy Carter had been sworn in as President earlier in the
year, having run a campaign that promised, among other things, to put
human rights at the center of American foreign policy.69 His
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1976).
66. Congress, through the House Committee on Industrial Relations (which had
competence over military sales), later published the first report as “Human Rights Practices in
Countries Receiving United States Security Assistance (1976).” See U.S. DEP’T STATE,
ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS 1 (1977).
67. H.R. REP. NO. 95-501, at 29 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 95-88, §
111(a), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (1977)).
68. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n(d)(1), (6) (1977).
69. Leslie H. Gelb, Human‐Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford‐Carter
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1976), https://www nytimes.com/1976/10/08/archives/
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administration embraced the new congressional reporting requirements, and Carter announced the elevation of the Coordinator of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to Assistant Secretary for Human Rights in August 1977.70 Carter appeared to be in step with
congressional concerns about U.S. support for repressive regimes and
championed the elevation of human rights as a pillar of U.S. foreign
policy. The first full Country Report on Human Rights, covering all
states receiving military and humanitarian assistance, was submitted
to Congress from the State Department in January 1978.71
B. Global Human Rights Monitoring and Reporting
In 1979, Congress expanded the scope of countries for which
annual reports would be required beyond aid recipients to include “all
other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations.”72
In 1980, Congress expanded the illustrative—though not exhaustive—
list of “internationally recognized human rights,” from the prohibition
against “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of
the right to life, liberty and the security of person” to include “causing
the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons.”73 In 1984, a restriction on the extension of trade
preferences to certain countries was added the U.S. Code, barring Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) trading status to countries that
do not afford “internationally recognized worker rights” to workers.74
Congress also added the category of “worker rights” and labor rights
such as collective bargaining, occupation safety, and acceptable wages

humanrights-and-morality-issue-runs-through-fordcarter-debate html
[https://perma.cc/4UAT-NLT7].
70. SNYDER, supra note 39, at 171.
71. U.S. DEP’T STATE, supra note 66, at 1. The report was transmitted in 1978 but
covered activity for the year 1977.
72. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(1)(B) (1979). The statute also included a requirement that the
State Department report to Congress on the “impact” of the human rights reporting on U.S.
foreign policy. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1979). See also H.R. REP. NO. 96-397 at 43 (1979) (Conf.
Rep.).
73. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1979), with 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1980) (expanding
the list of internationally recognized human rights to include “causing the disappearance of
persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons”).
74. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461, 2462(b)(2)(G).
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and hours to the coverage required in the annual human rights reporting.75
Congress added another requirement in 1987 that, “wherever
applicable, practices regarding coercion in population control, including coerced abortion and involuntary sterilization” be included in the
annual reports.76 In 1990, it added the restriction that “[n]o assistance
may be provided to any government failing to take appropriate and
adequate measures within their means to protect children from exploitation, abuse, or forced conscription into military or paramilitary services.”77 This was included without adding new content requirements
to the Country Reports. In 1994, as part of the reorganization of the
Department of State in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,78 the
position of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs was replaced by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.79
In 1996, two additional content requirements were added to the
Country Reports: (1) “the votes of each member of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights on all country specific and thematic
resolutions voted on at the Commission’s annual session during the
period covered during the preceding year;”80 and (2) “the extent to
which each country has extended protection to refugees, including the
provision of first asylum and resettlement.”81

75. 19 U.S.C. § 2464; 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4). The new provision required that the
President submit to Congress an annual report “on the status of internationally recognized
worker rights” within GSP countries. 19 U.S.C. § 2464 (enacted by Pub. L. No. 98-573 on
Oct. 30, 1984).
76. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(2) (1987).
77. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(b) (1990) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 101-513 § 599D).
78. H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 22 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 103-236).
79. Id. at 23. The House Conference Report for the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
states that the position of Assistant Secretary for DRL “shall maintain continuous observation
and review all matters pertaining to human rights and humanitarian affairs (including matters
related to prisoners of war and members of the United States Armed Forces missing in action)
in the conduct of foreign policy including the following:” (summarized as) i) gathering the
detailed information for each country to which the FAA requirements apply; ii) preparing the
reports required by the FAA; iii) making recommendations to the Secretary of State and the
Administrator of the Agency for International Development regarding compliance with the
FAA; and iv) performing other responsibilities which serve to promote increased observance
of internationally recognized human rights by all countries. Id.
80. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(4) (1996) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 104-319, title II, § 201(a)).
81. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(5) (1996) (also enacted by Pub. L. No. 104-319, title II, §
201(a)).
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Congress added two more topics to the required reports in
1998: (1) “the status of child labor practices in each country;” and (2)
“wherever applicable, violations of religious freedom, including particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”82 The second was
included as part of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
(“IRFA”),83 whose purpose was
to reduce and eliminate the widespread and ongoing religious persecution taking place throughout the world
today. It seeks to achieve this objective by increasing
the priority attached in U.S. foreign policy to the problem of religious persecution; by threatening to impose
sanctions on foreign governments that carry out or condone serious religious persecution; and by seeking to
increase the protections available to victims of religious
persecution.84
IRFA went even further to ensure that Congress was receiving complete information on religious persecution, requiring the creation of the
State Department Office on International Religious Freedom, 85 along
with a Director, later titled Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom.86 The Ambassador has a general responsibility to
“advance the right to freedom of religion abroad, to denounce the violation of that right, and to recommend appropriate responses by the
United States Government when this right is violated [serving a direct
advisory role to the President and Secretary of State].”87 The position
is also charged with preparing and transmitting to Congress “an Annual Report on International Religious Freedom supplementing the
most recent Human Rights Reports by providing additional detailed
information with respect to matters involving international religious
freedom.”88
Both the House Report for IRFA and the law as drafted stressed
the requirement of input from religious and human rights nongovernmental organizations or other interested parties to supplement the findings of the Country Reports, codifying, in part, formal cooperation between the State Department and human rights NGOs that had begun to
82. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(7) (1998).
83. H.R. REP. NO. 105-480(I), at 9–10 (1998) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 105-292 §
102(d)(1)).
84. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 4.
86. Id.; 22 U.S.C. § 6411.
87. 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c)(1), (2).
88. 22 U.S.C. § 6412(b)(1).
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develop as part of the process of preparing the Country Reports.89 The
report must also distinguish between violations “conducted with the
involvement or support of government officials or agents, or pursuant
to official government policy” and those not conducted under such
“but which the government fails to undertake serious and sustained efforts to eliminate being able to do so.”90 Apart from the violations of
international standards, the report is to contain trends toward improvement or deterioration, U.S. actions and policy in support of religious
freedom with respect to each country, a description of any binding
agreement entered into between the foreign government and the United
States, the training and guidelines on violations of religious freedom
provided to judges and officers within the country, and an Executive
Summary for each country.91 The State Department is asked to designate “persecuted communities.”92 The designation has two purposes:
to trigger congressional sanctions against particular countries and to
support asylum claims from individual members of those designated
religious communities.93 The inclusion of the latter purpose explicitly
linked IRFA reporting to asylum claims, a recognition by Congress of
the ways in which earlier human rights reports were being used by
claimants.94
IRFA also created the congressionally controlled U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”), a step many
viewed as an effort by Congress to add independent oversight of the
State Department.95 The redundancy was motivated in part by distrust
of the State Department among some conservatives, who were skeptical State would report adequately on the plight of Christians in countries where they represented a minority or on behalf of Christian missionaries who faced problems in states that ban proselytizing.96
89. H.R. REP. NO. 105-480(I), at 4; 22 U.S.C. § 6412(c)(2). See also discussion infra
Section III.B.
90. H.R. REP. NO. 105-480(I), at 3.
91. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6412(b)(1)(A)–(F).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 105-480(III), at 16.
93. Id.
94. For a discussion of the use of human rights reports in asylum claims in U.S. courts,
see infra Section III.D.
95. Pub. L. No. 105-292, Title II, §§ 201–06 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6431–36).
96. See Laurie Goodstein, A Rising Movement Cites Persecution Facing Christians,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/09/us/a-rising-movementcites-persecution-facing-christians.html [https://perma.cc/CP9R-E5AJ]. For a full discussion
of the U.S. approach to international religious freedom, see ANNA SU, EXPORTING FREEDOM:
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND AMERICAN POWER 4–5 (2016) (describing the promotion and
protection of religious liberty in U.S. foreign policy during the twentieth century, including
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USCIRF’s central responsibilities are: (1) the annual and ongoing review of the facts and circumstances of violations of religious freedom
presented in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the Annual Report, and the Executive Summary, as well as information from
other sources as appropriate; and (2) the making of policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress with respect to matters involving international religious freedom.97 USCIRF
conducts independent reporting on religious freedom, issues an annual
report, and oversees a “watch list” of countries that are not meeting the
internationally-defined standard for respect of religion or belief.98
In 1999, two more requirements were added to the Country Reports: (1) “wherever applicable, consolidated information regarding
the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and evidence
of acts that may constitute genocide;”99 and (2) reporting on human
trafficking.100 The trafficking information provision was codified
prior to the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (“TVPA”), passed in October 2000.101 The TVPA also
requires that the President establish an Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking, and “authorizes” the Secretary of State
to establish an Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking within the
the shift from the Cold War anti-communism logic to the post-Cold War use of religious
liberty as justification for the use of American power), and see generally PASQUALE
ANNICCHINO, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE
AMERICAN MODEL (2017).
ON
INT’L
RELIGIOUS
97. See
About
Us,
COMM’N
https://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/about-us [https://perma.cc/H9FC-ZYY8].

FREEDOM,

98. See USCIRF Watch List, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
https://www.uscirf.gov/uscirf-watch-list [https://perma.cc/P7XH-GBAJ].
99. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 806 (1999) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(8)).
100. Pub. L. No. 106-113 § 597 (1999) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(f)(1)(A)).
101. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101–14). The TVPA was based on congressional findings that “[a]s
the 21st century begins, the degrading institution of slavery continues throughout the world.
Trafficking in persons is a modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery
today. At least 700,000 persons annually, primarily women and children, are trafficked within
or across international borders. Approximately 500,000 women and children are trafficked
into the United States each year . . . . Trafficking in persons is not limited to the sex industry.
This growing transnational crime also includes forced labor and involves significant violations
of labor, public health, and human rights standards worldwide.” Id. § 102(b)(1), (3) (codified
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101(b)(1), (3)). The TVPA revises some of the language in § 2151n(f)
introduced the year before, but the scope is essentially the same: a description of the nature
and extent of trafficking, and a detailed assessment of the government and specific authorities
regarding their participation in or facilitation of trafficking, measures taken to combat
trafficking, assistance to and treatment of victims, and degree of international cooperation. Id.
§ 104.
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State Department.102 This Office was created in October 2001, and
although the requirements reporting on trafficking were established
under the same statutory provisions as the Country Reports on Human
Rights, the State Department has produced a separate Trafficking in
Persons Report since 2001.103
In 2002, the Country Reports Act was again expanded to include: (1) forced recruitment and conscription of individuals under the
age of eighteen—which Congress states is “related to each country’s
compliance with standards set forth in the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children
in Armed Conflict;”104 and (2) “for each country with respect to which
the report indicates that extrajudicial kills, torture, or other serious violations of human rights have occurred in the country, the extent to
which the United States has taken or will take action to encourage an
end to such practices in the country.”105 This second requirement was
part of the establishment of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund,
created to:
(1) support defenders of human rights; (2) assist the
victims of human rights violations; (3) respond to human rights emergencies; (4) promote and encourage the
growth of democracy, including the support for nongovernmental organizations in foreign countries; and
(5) carry out such other related activities as are consistent with paragraphs (1) through (4) . . . .106
The Human Rights and Democracy Fund is administered by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, setting it outside the usual administration of development assistance
through the U.S. Agency for International Development.107
The annual reporting requirements were further amended in
2004, with the requirement that the State Department report separately
on the problem of anti-Semitism,108 in 2009, with the requirement to
102. Id. § 105(a), (e).
103. Id. § 104(a).
104. H.R. REP. NO. 107-671, at 143 (2002) (Conf. Rep.).
105. Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 665(a) (2002) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(10) (2002)).
106. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n-2(b) (2002).
107. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n-2(a) (2002).
108. The report must include “wherever applicable, a description of the nature and extent
of acts of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic incitement that occur during the preceding year,
including descriptions of (A) acts of physical violence against, or harassment of Jewish people,
and acts of violence against, or vandalism of Jewish community institutions, including
schools, synagogues, and cemeteries; (B) instances of propaganda in government and
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report on press freedoms, and in 2013, to report on the status of child
marriages.109 Congress has imposed on the State Department a rather
heavy human rights reporting workload, requiring the production of
four global human rights reports per year—all with different deadlines.110 In addition, over the years, Congress has enacted dozens of
country-specific laws that establish human rights certification and reporting requirements for targeted bilateral assistance programs.111
Congress has also adopted reporting and sanctions legislation targeting
individuals and non-state actors responsible for attacks on human
nongovernment media that attempt to justify or promote radical hatred or incite acts of
violence against Jewish people; (C) the actions, if any, taken by the government of the country
to respond to such violence and attacks or to eliminate such propaganda or incitement; (D) the
actions taken by such government to enact and enforce laws relating to the protection of the
right to religious freedom of Jewish people; and (E) the efforts of such government to promote
anti-bias and tolerance education.” Global Anti-Semitism Review Act of 2004 § 6(a), 22
U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(8).
109. See Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act of 2009 § 2, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(12);
see also Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 1207, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(g)
(requiring that the Country Reports include a “description of the status of the practice of child
marriage” in countries where “child marriage is prevalent”).
110. See infra Appendix for the four global reports and their deadlines. This list does not
include country-specific reporting, or ad hoc requests by Congress that may be triggered under
particular statutory provisions. The list also does not include “self-reporting” of the U.S.
submission to the Universal Periodic Review and the United Nations Human Rights Council,
or the periodic reports required by U.S. membership in the ICCPR, CERD, and CAT, which
are generally coordinated by the Department of State. See Interview with Senior Officials,
Bureau of Democracy, Hum. Rts., & Lab., U.S. Dep’t State (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with
author); see also United States, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5
of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/22/USA/1,
annex IV (Feb. 13, 2015) (explaining the process of compiling the report).
111. See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Note, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALE
J. INT’L L. 69, 80–82 (1988) (“Country-specific prohibitions . . . became increasingly common
as an alternative to the general human right-based prohibition because the legislation could
employ more specific language when applied to particular countries.”); Stephen B. Cohen,
Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 246,
254–56 (1982) (noting country-specific legislation attached to aid for Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Korea, Uruguay, and Zaire between
1975 and 1982). One example is the 2007 Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America
(amended in 2010 to separate Central America by creating a separate Central American
Regional Security Initiative (“CARSI”)). See PETER J. MEYER & CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41731, CENTRAL AMERICA REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE:
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 24 (2015). Another example is security
assistance to Ukraine, military assistance part of which the United States has conditioned on
reaching particular certifications. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 §
1235, 22 U.S.C. § 2593a note (amending reporting requirements under the Ukraine Freedom
Support Act of 2014, 22 U.S.C. § 8929 10(c)). See also CORY WELT, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R45008, UKRAINE: BACKGROUND, CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA, AND U.S. POLICY 42 (2020).

388

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[59:2

rights defenders. For example, the Leahy Law was adopted as two
amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act (“FAA”), which applies to
the State Department, and the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”),
which applies to the Department of Defense.112 The Leahy Act intends
to prohibit U.S. assistance to any foreign security forces unit where the
United States has “credible information that the unit has committed a
gross violation of human rights.”113 The 2012 Magnitsky Act was
adopted to identify and impose sanctions on individuals involved in
the murder of Russian journalist Sergei Magnitsky as well as other
gross human rights violations committed against individuals exposing
illegal activity of the Russian government.114 The 2016 Global Magnitsky Act expanded the availability of sanctions imposed upon any
“foreign person” who engages in “gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights” against human right rights advocates and
activists.115 Together, the general and targeted monitoring and reporting requirements demand significant resources at embassies abroad
and within the State Department. The next section addresses how Congress has molded the structure of the foreign affairs bureaucracy to
meet the demands of human rights reporting and monitoring.
C. Embedding Human Rights Diplomacy in the Bureaucracy
Congressional oversight has extended beyond the substance of
diplomatic reporting to include restructuring of the processes and institutions of diplomacy. Congress mandated the creation of the Office
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and codified its later incarnation as the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
and its current structure as the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,

112. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 § 651, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a) (FAA
amendment); Carl Levin & Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2015 § 1204, 10 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (AECA amendment).
113. See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a); 10 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
114. The full name of the statute is the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and
Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012. Pub. L. No. 112-2018, 126 Stat.
1496 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C) [hereinafter Magnitsky Act].
For a section of the statute addressing individual sanctions for abuses, see Magnitsky Act, §
404, 22 U.S.C. § 5811 note (Identification of Persons Responsible for the Detention, Abuse,
and Death of Sergei Magnitsky and Other Gross Violations of Human Rights).
115. Global Magnitsky Act, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2533 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
2656 note (Human Rights Sanctions)). A similarly individually targeted statute addressing a
specific human rights problem is the Uyghur Act, Pub. L. No. 116-145, 134 Stat. 648 (codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 9601 note (Imposition of Sanctions)).
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and Labor (“DRL”).116 Congress later created ambassadorial positions
overseeing reporting on human trafficking, international religious freedom (concurrent with the creation of USCIRF), and war crimes.117
The combination of a yearly reporting requirement with mandates to
create new offices focused explicitly on particular human rights has
embedded the content of human rights norms within the institutions of
American bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.118
Moreover, the language of United States diplomacy over the
past four decades has kept pace with the growth of international human
rights.119 The weaving of “human rights talk” into the diplomatic narrative has altered and shaped expectations within bilateral and multilateral relationships in ways that reflect original congressional purposes. At times, however, the monitoring and reporting mandates
work at cross-purposes in particular bilateral relationships, where security or economic policy might be prioritized over human rights. Indeed, the “nuisance” of congressional human rights mandates to particular bilateral relationships underscores the ways in which
monitoring and reporting norms affect day-to-day behavior. Even
where diplomatic and strategic relationships have not been determined
by human rights, those relationships have been affected by the monitoring and public reporting under the general congressional mandates.120
Diplomacy is both a legal and political practice. Diplomacy is
created and protected by international law and is carried out as
116. Bureau status at the State Department places human rights on equal footing with
regional bureaus and other subject-matter bureaus such as Economic and Business Affairs and
International Organizations. A Bureau is headed by an Assistant Secretary who sits two levels
below the Secretary of State on the reporting chain. See 22 U.S.C. § 2651a (codifying
organizational mandates for the State Department). The State Department Office of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was created during the Ford Administration and upgraded to
the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in 1977 under President Carter.
SNYDER, supra note 39, at 166, 171. It was renamed the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor in 1994. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 § 162,
22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994). Congress created its own human rights commission, the Lantos
Human Rights Commission, as a formal follow-on to the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus, created in 1983. See H.R. Res 1451, 110th Cong. (2008) (passed by unanimous
consent).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
118. See Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110.
119. See McGuinness, supra note 25, at 473–74; Interview with Senior Officials, supra
note 110.
120. This effect is present even where waivers of sanctions are granted and/or where
Congress adopts country-specific conditions to get around the general legislation’s aid
conditionality. For a discussion of decoupling of reporting from sanctions, see infra Part IV.

390

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[59:2

representation and governance. Representation refers to the ways in
which diplomats formally represent the interests of one state to another, which includes building economic, political and cultural relationships between states and also the making of international law
through treaty and customary practice. State interests also include promoting and enforcing international law and international governance
institutions, and representation of those interests often overlaps with
governance functions. Diplomats also serve to carry out domestic legal mandates, sometimes in complementary function with consular
representation, which focuses on protection of co-nationals and the facilitation of particular cross-border legal processes, such as visa and
passport issuance. Increasingly in the past forty years, specialized
agencies, including the Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture and Justice
Departments have posted officials in overseas embassies as well as in
divisions within agency headquarters devoted to international regulatory matters, both cross-border and within international institutions.121
The administration of congressionally delegated powers in coordination with and through diplomatic representatives has become commonplace.
In much the same way, U.S. human rights diplomacy—as mandated by Congress—is practiced as both human rights representation
and human rights governance.122 Human rights diplomacy includes
aspects of enforcing compliance with international human rights law,
as well as promoting membership in and supporting the work of international human rights law and institutions. Human rights diplomacy
also includes monitoring, interpreting, and reporting the human rights
practices of foreign states, communicating with those states the importance of protecting human rights, and leveraging financial and other
benefits with the goal of improving human rights behavior. The formal
diplomatic and investigatory processes that are necessary to the

121. See Ingber, supra note 17, at 416–19 (discussing Congress’s role in designing
executive branch foreign policy agencies and processes within agencies); see also Overseas
Offices, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legal-attache-offices
[https://perma.cc/XSV9-R9UD] (listing U.S. embassies that host FBI attachés). For a
discussion of the general approach to congressional funding of international
operations⎯including those of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice and
Treasury—see CORY R. GILL ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46367, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS: FY2021 BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS 23–
29 (2020).
122. Ole Jacob Sending et al., The Future of Diplomacy: Changing Practices, Evolving
Relationships, 66 INT’L J. 527, 529, 538–40 (2011) (distinguishing between representation and
governance functions of diplomacy).
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monitoring and reporting of human rights, as well as the subsequent
uses of human rights reports, operate as human rights governance.123
D. The Internalization of International Human Rights Law
Congress has embraced international human rights law and
norms more deeply than is appreciated when we speak in generalities
of human rights “policy.”124 Indeed, one consistent feature of congressional human rights mandates is the way in which they have moved in
parallel with international human rights law itself: from the aspirational and hortatory nature of rights laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),125 to the more specified obligations
of the ICCPR and later to narrower subject-matter protocols such as
the anti-trafficking protocol of the UN Convention against Transnational Crime.126 Rather than viewing the rest of the world through the
lens of a particularized American constitutional view of rights, Congress has been comfortable and consistent with its use of international
conventions as the legal and normative standard against which foreign
state human rights behavior is judged.127 Given the strong form of
American exceptionalism that animated congressional opposition in
the late 1940s and early 1950s to any plans for the United States to join
international human rights treaties, this explicit and consistent adoption of the language of international human rights into the U.S. Code
123. ALSTON & KNUCKEY, supra note 23, at 5–7 (discussing the proliferation of factfinding bodies within international human rights governance structures).
124. This goes beyond mere agenda setting. Ingber, supra note 17, at 413.
125. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
(declaring that, e.g., “Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of person”).
126. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; G.A. Res. 55/25, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
(Nov. 15, 2000).
127. American constitutional values are invoked by Congress in the mandates. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304 (“The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth
in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and
traditions of the United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion. And accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be
to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all
countries.”) (emphasis added). But the standard of assessment is international human rights
law. U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1986
INSTRUCTIONS CABLE (1986) (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994 INSTRUCTIONS CABLE (1994) (on file with author); U.S.
DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001 INSTRUCTIONS
CABLE (2001) (on file with author).

392

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[59:2

is somewhat surprising. But it reflects the burgeoning of international
human rights law and institutions in the 1970s and 1980s, and the
availability of text—viewed by the United States as generally consistent with U.S. constitutional rights protections—that could be said
to be universal, and therefore able to bridge the gap between U.S. domestic rights practice and its international human rights policy.128
In its initial oversight legislation, Congress was concerned with
those states that engaged in “consistent patterns of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights,” which required some examination of what “internationally recognized” rights were, as opposed to
the kinds of rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.129 In the years
prior to the ICCPR, which came into force in 1976, the UDHR stood
as the sole universally adopted statement of the parameters of human
rights. It was thus the UDHR that Congress used as its standards in
the early years of its human rights policy oversight, mimicking directly
text from the UDHR aiming to prohibit “torture or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment,” “prolonged detention without
charges,” and other “flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty and the
security of the person.”130 Because the UDHR was adopted as a nonbinding General Assembly resolution, adoption of its text did not, perhaps, represent the kind of dissonance with the U.S. domestic approach
to rights as later human rights treaties did. Rather, it was championed
as reflecting the same core values as the U.S. Constitution. Congress
could thus plausibly claim that the behavior it sought in other countries
paralleled that required of the government at home.131
Notwithstanding the textual reference to international human
rights standards in the CHRMs, U.S. constitutional rights developments also influenced how Congress defined the scope of rights. For
example, the domestic women’s and civil rights movements and, later,
particularized American views on religious liberty, influenced the
128. For general histories of the rise of human rights in U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s,
see SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 46–47 (2010); SNYDER,
supra note 39, at 1–6; KEYS, supra note 35, at 127–28; Samuel Moyn, The Return of the
Prodigal: The 1970s as a Turning Point in Human Rights History, in THE BREAKTHROUGH,
supra note 39, at 8–10; Sargent, supra note 39, at 125–45; Carl J. Bon Tempo, Human Rights
and the U.S. Republican Party in the Late 1970s, in THE BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 39, at
146–65.
129. See supra Sections II.A., II.B.
130. For discussion of 22 U.S.C. § 2304, see supra Section II.A.
131. See, e.g., Fiscal Year 1975 Foreign Assistance Request: Hearing on H.R. Doc 93293 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Aff., 93rd Cong. 4 (1974) (statement of Hon. Henry A.
Kissinger, Secretary of State) (“A nation’s foreign policy must be rooted in its most basic
beliefs. The economic assistance program of the United States is an expression of our moral
values.”).
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breadth and specificity of rights behavior that was of interest to Congress.132 Yet even when Congress acted to place an American stamp
on a particular area of rights it added to the reporting requirements, it
largely did so through the language of international human rights instruments. One prominent example of this is the amendment to the
human rights mandates created by the 1998 International Religious
Freedom Act (“IRFA”). IRFA required the State Department to pay
particular attention to religious persecution, and also created the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”) whose
mandate is to report and maintain a watch list according to the standards of the UDHR.133 USCIRF describes the legal standards that it
applies to its reporting as follows:
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides that “everyone has the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest this religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.”134
USCIRF goes on to say that “[b]y relying on international human
rights standards as specified in IRFA, USCIRF is not attempting to
impose American values on other nations, but rather examines the actions of foreign governments against these universal standards and by
their freely undertaken international commitments.”135 This language
attempts to preempt the criticism of double standards by claiming that
the United States is not imposing its particularized view of religious
liberty (under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment) on other states.136 At the same time, the statute makes
clear that, for the United States, religious freedom ranks as fundamental and a high-priority right among all international human rights commitments.137 An explicit adoption of the international standard was
arguably necessary to blunt criticism of double standards or hypocrisy
by assessing foreign states in accordance with the legal instruments
132. SNYDER, supra note 39 at 9, 12–13; KEYS, supra note 35, at 133, 135–38; SU, supra
note 96, at 3.
133. International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §§ 2, 202, 112 Stat. 2787,
2788, 2798–99 (1998).
134. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, https://
www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/XUP5-ASLC].
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. For the history on the earlier versions of IRFA considered by Congress, see SU, supra
note 96, at 142–44.
137. See International Religious Freedom Act § 2, supra note 133.

394

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[59:2

those states have undertaken to obey as a part of their international
commitments. IRFA thus had two purposes. First, it sought to apply
a particular American view of religious liberty on states that have historically refused to join human rights treaties that guarantee religious
liberties, or that, like the United States itself, have attached reservations to treaty commitments which avoid international oversight on
questions of religious liberties.138 Second, it tried to establish “religious liberty” (as understood in American jurisprudence under the Free
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution) as synonymous with “international religious freedom.”139 By applying an interpretive gloss on
the texts of the UDHR and ICCPR, IRFA attempts to accomplish this
delicate balance between an American “exceptionalist” or particular
understanding of religious freedom on the one hand, and the international human rights understanding of religious freedom on the other.140
This blending of constitutional commitment to religious liberty
and the international human rights protections of religious freedom is
further reflected in IRFA’s creation of two parallel institutions to monitor the practice of religious liberty. The USCIRF, which operates as
a congressional agency, reflects the interest of its commissioners
(jointly nominated by Congress and the President) who represent the
interests of religious organizations and legal practitioners devoted to
advancing religious freedom for particular groups.141 The Office of
138. See SU, supra note 96, at 142–47; S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20 (1992) (containing
numerous Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations to the U.S. Senate Resolution of
Ratification for the ICCPR).
139. The argument for special treatment of “international religious freedom” came from
Republicans (Senator Sam Brownback) and Democrats (Representative Tom Lantos) during
the drafting process of the IRFA. SU, supra note 96, at 145. However, IRFA has been
criticized for: (1) creating an “irrational hierarchy” of human rights; and (2) taking a unilateral
approach to international religious freedom that would “weaken existing multilateral
regimes.” Id. at 145–46.
140. See Thomas F. Farr & William L. Saunders, Jr., The Bush Administration and
America’s International Religious Freedom Policy, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 952
(2009) (discussing the history of IRFA and the Clinton administration’s opposition to the
IRFA’s intent to create a “hierarchy” of human rights). For a discussion of the work of
USCIRF in promoting these purposes, see Elizabeth K. Cassidy & Catherine Cosman, A View
from the United States: US Bilateral and Multilateral Promotion of Freedom of Religion or
Belief, in CHANGING NATURE OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 105–06
(Malcolm Evans et al. eds., 2015). See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
2018 ANNUAL REPORT: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23, 25; U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 72–79,
90–97 (discussing Saudi Arabia and Pakistan).
141. About Us, COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, https://www.uscirf.gov/aboutuscirf/about-us [https://perma.cc/H9FC-ZYY8]; Cassidy & Cosman, supra note 140, at 101,
105.
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International Religious Freedom with the State Department, on the
other hand, operates within the executive branch to demonstrate the
centrality of religious freedom to the broader project of human rights
diplomacy. Both institutions operate to promote the international human rights norm of religious freedom, while seeking to influence and
refine the content of that norm through the lens of the U.S. constitutional experience of religious freedom.142
The international human rights movement matured throughout
the 1970s and 1980s, with the growth of the jurisprudence of the InterAmerican and European Courts of Human Rights, and the formal
adoption of the ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, and the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”). The
statutory language of congressional mandates followed suit, adopting
more explicit standards emerging in subject matter treaties and expanding the scope of areas of concern.143 The State Department, as the
agency responsible for carrying out the monitoring demanded by the
statutes, was increasingly required to interpret the meaning of “international standards” and other text in preparing its reports.144 Each
year, the State Department, through the DRL Bureau, publishes instructions for the embassy and regional bureau staff tasked with preparing the reports.145 The instructions evolved over time from general
descriptions of the kind of practices that would constitute “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” to precise language that frequently matched verbatim the standards in human rights
instruments.146
The U.S. State Department gleaned these standards from multiple sources: (1) human rights institutions at the UN, where the United
States remained engaged in multilateral human rights policy through
its almost-uninterrupted membership in the UN Human Rights
142. SU, supra note 96, at 6; ANNICCHINO, supra note 96, at 19–21.
143. Interpretive issues over the meaning of “internationally recognized” arose early on,
when the “Sense of Congress” prompted the State Department to examine particular human
rights practices in aid recipient states. See FRASER REPORT, supra note 40, at 1–2. See also
H.R. REP. NO. 95-501, at 1, 10–11, 31 (1977). These include references in congressional
discussions of human rights oversight to the work of UN human rights organs. H.R. REP. NO.
95-501, at 49.
144. Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110.
145. These instructions were sent via cable to posts preparing the reports beginning in
1977. Since 2006, they have been posted via the State Department Intranet. Id.
146. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-501, at 49. The inclusion of “torture” in the human rights
reports is a good example of the emerging standards defined in a treaty. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994 INSTRUCTIONS CABLE
(1994) (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2002 INSTRUCTIONS CABLE (2002) (on file with author).
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Commission (later the Human Rights Council); (2) regional institutions with strong human rights agendas, such as the Organization for
American States and the Helsinki Commission; and (3) members of
civil society in foreign states and in Washington, D.C.147 Through the
reporting and monitoring mandates, the executive branch has been required to learn international human rights law and keep current on
treaty adoption, interpretation, and application. International human
rights law has thus been incorporated into the day-to-day work of the
executive branch in its external policy, much as full treaty adoption by
the United States would have worked to incorporate it in domestic policy. The next Part turns to how that process of monitoring and reporting operates, and how it forms a part of international human rights
governance.
III. MONITORING AND REPORTING AS HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE
John Ruggie has explained governance as “the systems of authoritative norms, rules, institutions, and practices by means of which
any collectivity, from the local to the global, manages its common affairs,” and global governance as “an instance of governance in the absence of government.”148 Human rights governance, under this view,
is the decentralized processes through which states, along with NGOs,
corporations and individuals, create, elucidate, and enforce the international human rights norms. In this conception, norms are created
and complied with as part of a transnational process. Harold Koh identified this general process of governance as transnational legal process.149 This framework is helpful to understanding the decentralized
nature of international lawmaking and the ways in which actors

147. U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2002
INSTRUCTIONS CABLE (2002) (on file with author). See generally, SARAH B. SNYDER, HUMAN
RIGHTS ACTIVISM AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: A TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE
HELSINKI NETWORK (2013).
148. Ruggie, supra note 20, at 5 (discussing the new governance theory as exemplified in
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 501–78 (2009)).
149. “Transnational legal process describes the theory and practice of how public and
private actors—nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals—interact in a variety of public and
private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize
rules of transnational law.” Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture:
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1994).

2021]

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING

397

interact with norms within institutions, and through processes of interactions with other actors, to manage international human rights.
Two decades following the adoption of the first congressional
human rights mandates, Sarah Cleveland explored unilateral economic
sanctions against rights-abusing regimes as a mechanism of transnational legal process and norm internalization.150 Professor Cleveland’s
study examined the unilateral sanctions regimes that Congress adopted
in tandem with, and in response to the waivers built into, the general
human rights mandates.151 She argued that the sanctions, along with
the processes developed to support them, served an important role in
protecting human rights in a world lacking a central adjudicative authority.152 If the United States responded to particular state action as
outside the bounds of acceptable behavior, and conditioned particular
policies on that assessment of non-compliance, that sanctioning (or in
the case of good behavior, non-sanctioning) would play a role in the
development of the content of norms. Sanctions thus contribute to
“domestic internalization by incorporating attention to human rights
concerns in the political process of the sanctioning state,” and to
“transnational internalization” by “attracting foreign attention to human rights concerns.”153
The unilateral congressional human rights monitoring and reporting mandates operate in support of sanctions, but also create a parallel and separate process that operates regardless of whether the foreign state being monitored is subject to sanctions. The processes and
the monitoring and reporting mandates imposed by Congress on the
executive branch contribute to domestic internalization of human
rights norms, regardless of sanctions behavior. The product of those
processes⎯the reports themselves⎯constitute a body of work created
by U.S. diplomats, guided by reporting requirements established by
Congress, that has legal value independent of sanctions.
This Part addresses the ways in which monitoring and reporting serve to internalize international human rights law domestically
and thus contribute to human rights governance internationally. It
draws on a broad range of sources⎯domestic and foreign asylum
150. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 5 (2001). For an earlier examination of the effectiveness of congressional sanctions
legislation, see David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign
Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002, 1002 (1987).
151. Cleveland, supra note 150, at 8–21 (examining the case of sanctions against Burma
by the federal government, as a complement to efforts at the local and state level, as well as
within multilateral organizations).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 7.
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cases, caselaw and reports of international courts, commissions, and
committees, and the reporting of NGOs⎯to illustrate the influence of
the reports in a variety of adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory settings.
The use of the reports in foreign and international legal institutions, as
well as by NGOs, reveals how unilateral U.S. human rights diplomacy
has helped shape the development of human rights law separate and
apart from the processes of unilateral sanctions. The research findings
here prompt questions about how other forms of human rights factfinding and monitoring have been deployed or may be deployed in
support of human rights governance and suggest some avenues for future research.
A. Monitoring and Reporting as Human Rights Fact-Finding
The preparation of the human rights reports requires State Department officials—both those in the field serving as embassy “human
rights officers” and those in the DRL Bureau—to engage in year-long
data collection of rights practices. The data collection takes place in
many different forms, and is coordinated by DRL through instructions
to overseas U.S. missions that include categories of human rights, definitions, and advice on sources.154 The process includes: close scrutiny of news and social media reporting on political, civil and social
rights; direct conversations with members of the government engaged
in law enforcement and judicial administration; meetings with political
parties, dissidents, and members of the opposition to government; conversations with members of civil society groups (e.g. academics, rights
activists, lawyers, and journalists); review of official and unofficial reporting of international and regional human rights institutions and of
international and local human rights NGOs; meeting with investigators
associated with international and local human rights NGOs; and, in
countries that restrict access to the forgoing channels, review of information available from NGOs and other sources outside the state.155
In gathering facts to prepare the reports, executive branch officials thus communicate and cooperate with particular groups and institutions, many of which are wholly outside the formal channels of
traditional bilateral diplomacy between foreign ministries and offices
of the heads of state. This process of engagement places the State
154. Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110.
155. See, e.g., Telegram from the Dep’t of State to All Diplomatic & Consular Posts &
the Embassies in Cape Verde, the Republic of Congo, & Uganda (Aug. 4, 1979),
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v02/d190 [https://perma.cc/3MEBRMXZ]. See also Margaret E. McGuinness, Instructions Cables for Country Reports (Dec. 3,
2020) (dataset on file with author).

2021]

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING

399

Department within the human rights movement, reporting on conditions side-by-side with civil society and international and regional human rights institutions, which are also monitoring and reporting on human rights conditions. One consequence of the State Department
working from inside the human rights movement is its reliance on human rights journalists, activists, and NGOs to provide the information
needed for the annual reports, and a reciprocal reliance by those same
journalists, activists, and NGOs on the State Department reports for
their own work. It represents a normative feedback loop between these
actors and also serves as an important coordinating mechanism and
focal point for U.S. engagement in international human rights governance outside the formal treaty bodies.
Over the years, the institutionalization of human rights factfinding within the State Department has also proved quite useful to
Congress. While the general default statutory provisions of the FAA
and ISA were never invoked to cut off aid automatically, the content
of the reports proved useful in pushing for the targeted legislation that
conditioned aid on specific benchmarks. The reports highlight problems in particular countries, which Congress can then point to as justification for further restrictions on the executive’s prerogatives to
award aid packages in targeted countries and to crafting individual
sanctions legislation.156 The State Department may present the reports
as the considered and “objective” view of the U.S. government of a
particular state’s rights practices for strategic purposes in diplomatic
negotiations.
In addition to this particular use in diplomacy, the reports are
relied upon by many official and unofficial actors outside of Congress
and have come to serve as a valuable reference guide in many other
policy making contexts.157 For example, human rights NGOs, which
in the early days of the Country Reports used them as a foil for critiquing how U.S. reporting and policy fell short of universal human rights
ideals, use the reporting to corroborate their own work. The process
and institutionalization of human rights within the State Department
has provided an institutional focal point for lobbying in the executive
156. A recent example regarding Russia can be seen in the Minority Staff Report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia
and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security.” MINORITY STAFF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELS., S. REP. 115-21 (2018). The Senate staff report cites to the State Department Country
Report on Human Rights for the years ranging from 2001 through 2018 in more than a dozen
places in the report. See, e.g., id. at 15 n.53. They also provide a focal point for targeted,
multilateral sanctions. See id. at 153–62.
157. The work of the Department of Homeland Security on issues of asylum and
deportation is one example. The Department of Defense and its work in institution building
overseas is another.
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branch, evidenced, perhaps, by the fact that several assistant secretaries for Human Rights came from careers in human rights advocacy.158
The multiplicity of ways in which the U.S. government takes part in
norm elaboration and interpretation as it engages in the processes of
monitoring and reporting form a kind of state practice.
B. Human Rights Monitoring and Reporting as Opinio Juris
To understand how the reporting process affects U.S. actors
and institutions, we need to examine not just the costs of the reports as
shaming “talk,” but their value as “legal talk” as well. As Chimène
Keitner has explained in the context of the jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court, any practice in which states describe behavioral expectations about the content of human rights law might, in fact, represent opinio juris for the purpose of customary international law.159
Similarly, Kate Shaw has explored how presidential foreign policy
statements may represent opinio juris.160 Here, the statements about
the content of international human rights norms are being made by the
executive branch, in a process overseen by Congress, which supports
a conclusion that these reports may constitute U.S. opinio juris regarding the content of customary international human rights law.161
The reports themselves describe facts on the ground in particular countries. They require framing these facts within a sub-heading

158. Prime examples include Richard Schifter (who became the Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in 1985, after spending years representing
indigenous peoples in their suits against the U.S. government), Harold Koh (who was a leading
international law and human rights scholar who led human rights litigation prior to becoming
the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in 1998), Michael
Posner (who headed Human Rights First from 1978 until he became the Assistant Secretary
of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in 2009), and Tomasz Malinowski (who
was a lobbyist for Human Rights Watch before becoming Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in 2014). See U.S. Dep’t State, Assistant Secretaries
of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/
12258 htm [https://perma.cc/975F-VBEH].
159. Chimène I. Keitner, ‘Cheap Talk’ About Customary International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 494, 494 (David
L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
160. Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96
TEX. L. REV. 71, 134–37 (2017). See also McGuinness, supra note 25, at 471 (describing U.S.
human rights policy as “a means of projecting U.S. values and reinforcing internationally
created human rights norms”).
161. As discussed infra in Section III.D., the federal courts may also take judicial notice
of human rights practices from these reports.
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or category. Some categories reflect direct statutory mandates.162 For
example, in the early years of the mandates, Congress was concerned
with acts of “torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.”163 Under the category of “torture, or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment,” the State Department would then be required to
place sections of its report dealing with the practices engaged in by the
state being examined.164 By engaging in the factual identification of
what constitutes “torture,” the State Department makes a categorical
assessment of what kinds of behavior fall within the international definition of torture in the ICCPR and CAT. This “talk” of torture becomes a statement of what the United States believes the standard to
be—even in areas where it has, as a matter of treaty law, not consented
to having its own actions be bound by international standards. This
statement of what the State Department believes international law to
require is analogous to the kinds of statements made by courts and
other government actors that have been recognized as constituting
opinio juris.165
C. Accuracy and Politicization
Early on, the Country Reports were subject to criticism that,
because they reflect the policy goals and preferences of particular administrations, they are politicized and inaccurate.166 As a result, the
162. See supra Part II for discussion of statutory mandates. See also U.S. DEP’T STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1986 INSTRUCTIONS CABLE (1986) (on
file with author); U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1994 INSTRUCTIONS CABLE (1994) (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001 INSTRUCTIONS CABLE (2001) (on file with author).
163. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-480 (1998).
164. Id.
165. See KENNETH ANDERSON & BENJAMIN WITTES, SPEAKING THE LAW: THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S ADDRESSES ON NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 6–8 (2015). As an official
government document, that is governed by a statute requiring a report based on “international
standards,” it is reasonable to view the report as the best and most deliberative statement of
what the U.S. government believes the content of particular international human rights
standards to be. See also Ashley Deeks, Statutory International Law, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 263,
274–75 (2018) (discussing statutory references that instruct the executive branch to consider
whether actions are taken in accordance with international human rights standards).
166. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights/Human
Rights First Critiques of the Country Reports: States and Rights Covered (1978–1996; 2002)
(dataset on file with author). See also Matthew L. Fore, Shall Weigh Your God and You:
Assessing the Imperialistic Implications of the International Religious Freedom Act in Muslim
Countries, 52 DUKE L.J. 423, 451–52 (2002) (finding that the U.S. reports mandated by
Congress are politicized by friendly regimes); Steven C. Poe et al., How Are These Pictures
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Country Reports have been subjected to close scrutiny by foreign governments and non-state actors. This scrutiny has sometimes come in
the form of contentious discussions between the State Department and
civil society.167 These interactions have embedded human rights
norms and practices more deeply into the reporting functions of the
State Department, and prompted efforts to improve the accuracy and
fairness of the reporting.168 Criticism waned over time, as the process
of preparing the reports became a regular, carefully managed part of
U.S. diplomacy with an internal bureaucratic infrastructure to support
the processes of monitoring and reporting. By the mid-1990s, the socalled “shadow human rights report” critiquing the Country Reports
and filling in gaps, prepared by the U.S.-based Lawyers’ Committee
for Human Rights, was discontinued on the basis that the State Department had become more accurate and even-handed in its treatment of
friends and foes.169
The reports came to be relied on not because they were considered impartial and complete. Indeed, some of the early criticisms remain valid that, at least in tone and framing, the United States tends to
filter bad acts by friendly states and to overstate claims of abuse by
unfriendly states.170 Nonetheless, they came to be relied on because
of a lack of any alternative source. They were, for many years, the
only game in town. The publication of the reports reflected the scope
of U.S. diplomatic power and its capacity to monitor human rights
practices everywhere⎯far outstripping, for many years, the capacity
of the UN and regional human rights institutions.
Before the periodic self-reporting requirements of the ICCPR,
ICESCR, and other UN treaties were in place, and well before the UN
Human Rights Council adopted the Universal Periodic Review process
in 2007, the United States was regularly and systematically preparing
Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International
Human Rights Reports, 1976–1995, 23 HUM. RTS. Q., 650, 650–51 (2001) (asserting that the
United States Human Rights Reports are biased towards U.S.-friendly regimes and overly
critical of unfriendly regimes).
167. Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110.
168. Id.
169. The Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights (later Human Rights First) published its
first critique of the Country Reports in 1978 and its last in 1996. One exception was a special
report issued by Human Rights First reviewing the 2002 Country Reports on particular
countries in light of counter-terrorism measures undertaken by the United States after 9/11.
The reason for the special shadow report was to “look for evidence that country reports either
omitted or provided a positive gloss on abuses taken in the name of counter-terrorism.”
LAWS.’ COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., HOLDING THE LINE: A CRITIQUE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE’S ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, at i–ii (2003).
170. McGuinness, supra note 166.
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reports about human rights conditions in every UN member state.
Consistent with the view of reporting as part of foreign policy, the
United States did not prepare reports on itself⎯a fact which became a
central motif of criticism of the reports from state and non-state actors
alike.171 But the United States reported on all other states and measured their compliance with rights across a growing spectrum of
rights.172 No other systematic, periodic, and global reports by an official entity—national government or international organization—were
available prior to the adoption of the UPR process. Further, when human rights treaty bodies required reporting about the practices of member states, the only systematic reporting was self-reporting: the submission of reports by state parties describing their compliance with the
obligations under the treaties.173 Independent reporting on human
rights situations in particular states remains largely ad hoc within international organizations.174
The reports have been treated⎯by courts, by foreign governments, by NGOs⎯as generally accurate because of their systematic
method of production and the lack of alternatives.175 Competing
171. Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110. The Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, later Human Rights First, was the leading NGO critic of the politicization of
the Country Reports. See, e.g., LAWS.’ COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., CRITIQUE: REVIEW OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989, at 2–9
(1990). See also McGuinness, supra note 151.
172. The 1977 United States Country Report on Human Rights included 105 country
reports, and in 2019, the report included 185. Notably, however, the U.S. reports did not
include the core economic and social rights as enumerated in the ICESCR. Margaret E.
McGuinness, State Department Country Reports: States and Rights Covered (1977–2019)
(dataset on file with author). See infra Part III.
173. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 40, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (reporting requirement). See also Creamer & Simmons, supra note 22, at
35. For a summary of the regional reporting (Council of Europe) and more limited UN
reporting (thematic and selective) that was in the early 2000s, prior to the creation of the UN
Human Rights Council and adoption of the Universal Periodic Reporting Requirement, see
AUSTRIAN RED CROSS, RESEARCHING COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFO: A TRAINING MANUAL (2004),
https://www.coi-training net/site/assets/files/1031/en-coi_manual_part_i_plus_annex_
20060426.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH6S-DLT3].
174. This is changing with the expansion of the Special Procedures at the new UN Human
Rights Council, but it is well short of a universal approach to “outside” reporting. The ability
of NGOs and other states to comment on the UPRs filed by member states creates a record
from which more independent and objective assessments of human rights behavior might be
made. See OFF. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., SECRETARY-GENERAL’S REFORM AGENDA
(2002), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/reform htm [https://perma.cc/
ZD3W-JTDB].
175. See Creamer & Simmons, supra note 22, at 35 (claiming that reports are accurate
despite nations like the U.S. filtering unfavorable actions by allies and overstating abuses by
unfriendly nations). See also Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110; Michael H.
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reports prepared by global NGOs, in particular the annual report prepared by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have
emerged as important non-state sources and reporting.176 But the U.S.
Country Reports remain, for now, widely read and cited, including by
NGOs and international and regional human rights institutions.177
D. Monitoring and Reporting in International Lawmaking
The ways in which the United States—through the language of
the congressional reporting mandates and the interpretation of that language by the State Department—reports on human rights problems in
foreign states has informed other processes of international and domestic law, in ways not envisioned under the original congressional
mandates.178 A significant example is the role it has played in refugee
and asylum claims. The United States is a party to the 1951 Refugee
Convention (through the 1967 Protocol).179 Under the implementing
statute, the Refugee Act of 1980,180 the Departments of Justice and,
later, Homeland Security were required to apply the standard of a
“well-founded fear of persecution on account of religion (or race, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion).”181 Litigants on both sides of asylum adjudications (asylum seekers and the U.S. government) have sought authoritative sources to
prove or disprove membership in particular categories of persons
Posner, Response to Harold Koh’s Childress Lecture–A United States Human Rights Policy
for the 21st Century Respondent, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 411, 413 (2002) (“Over time . . . the
State Department’s reporting improved dramatically.” But “challenges also remain in
maintaining the high quality and reliability of the Country Reports . . . .”).
176. Human Rights Watch began its annual global report in 1990. Amnesty International
issued its first report on a group of political prisoners in 1962, but did not publish
comprehensive annual reports on global human rights practices until the 1990s.
177. Margaret E. McGuinness, Country Report Citations by NGO, IHR Courts, and
Commissions (dataset on file with author) (tracking citations to the Country Reports by
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, UN Human Rights Council⎯and its earlier
iteration, the UN Human Rights Commission⎯the European Court of Human Rights, and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
178. Later amendments to the human rights mandates explicitly understood the
developing asylum jurisprudence that relied on State Department Reporting. See supra
Section II.A. See also Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110.
179. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137;
Protocol of 1967, Apr. 10, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 7. The United States became a party to the
Protocol in 1968.
180. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101–07, 1157–59, 1521–24 (2018).
181. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 1, at 20 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 104-478, pt. 2,
at 136 (1996).
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protected under the Refugee Act. The Country Reports have served as
one important source. Even before reaching courts, administrative determinations made by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) may use Country
Reports as admissible statements of facts about conditions in particular
countries to assess credibility of asylum claims.182 DHS draws on the
report to support the government’s position in asylum and other human
rights-related claims.183 Under the International Religious Freedom
Act, immigration officers are specifically empowered to draw from the
reports in assessing claims for religious persecution.184
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,185 immigration judges
may, and frequently do, take judicial notice of the Country Reports in
determining treatment of particular social and other protected groups
under the 1980 Refugee Act.186 Between 1980 and 2017, over 4,000
reported federal asylum cases discussed the State Department Country
Report as evidence of human rights conditions in the country of origin
182. 8 C.F.R. § 208.12 (2020). An asylum seeker’s initial interaction with the United
States government is with Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). Pursuant to U.S. Code,
CBP officers and border patrol agent roles are governed by the U.S. Immigration and
Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2018). Initial intake interviews are performed by
immigration officers, who can be either Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) or
CBP officers. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2020). While CBP’s legal authority focuses on border
enforcement, and ICE enforces immigration laws in the interior of the country, those lines
have become blurred. See Anna Giaritelli, Trump Administration to Give Border Patrol
Agents Authority to Decide Asylum Claims on the Spot, WASH. EXAM’R (May 2, 2019, 2:30
PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/trump-administration-to-give-borderpatrol-agents-authority-to-decide-asylum-claims-on-the-spot-sources
[https://perma.cc/A5FT-95KF].
183. See, e.g., Humanitarian-Based Immigration Resources, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/humanitarian-based-immigration-resources
[https://perma.cc/J6AJDCW7] (listing the Country Reports as “additional government resources”).
184. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2020). “In deciding an asylum application, or in deciding
whether the alien has a credible fear of persecution or torture pursuant to § 208.30 of this part,
or a reasonable fear of persecution or torture pursuant to § 208.31, the asylum officer may rely
on material provided by the Department of State, other USCIS offices or other credible
sources, such as international organizations, private voluntary agencies, news organizations,
or academic institutions.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2020). “A country or geographic area may
be suspended from the Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program if that country or geographic area
is designated as a Country of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998 by the Department of State.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(q)(3)(ii) (2020).
185. FED. R. EVID. 201 (codifying rules for judicial notice). The Federal Rules of
Evidence guide, rather than direct, the admission of evidence in administrative hearings.
Administrative Law Judges may exercise discretion in excluding evidence that is immaterial,
irrelevant, or repetitive. Article I judges require administrative notice, whereas Article III
judges mandate the use of judicial notice. 29 C.F.R. § 503.44(b) (2020).
186. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1100 (2018).
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as part of assessing an asylum-seeker’s well-founded fear of persecution.187 Some federal judges have worried about the great deference
to, and potential overreliance on, the Country Reports in asylum
cases.188 The Country Reports can be either a boon or bane to asylum
seekers: reports often corroborate an asylum seeker’s claims of persecution based on their group membership. For those contesting a government denial of asylum, they can serve as a form of unofficial “judicial estoppel,” preventing the Department of Justice from arguing facts
contrary to official findings by the State Department.189 Where a
Country Report contradicts claims of an asylee, it bolsters the DOJ
position in the face of contrary evidence by the claimant.190
The Country Reports have thus become a recognized institutional feature of asylum claims in the United States, directly influencing asylum jurisprudence in the federal courts. Perhaps more remarkable is the influence they have had on asylum jurisprudence outside
the United States. In Canada, for example, between 1985 and 2017,
792 reported immigration cases assessing either asylum claims or stays
of deportation explicitly cited the State Department Country Reports

187. Between 1980 and 1985, only six asylum cases (out of 134) referenced the Country
Reports. Six cases (out of 172) discussed the reports between 1985 and 1990; 203 cases (out
of 1,152) between 1990 and 2000; 2,445 (out of 16,719 cases) between 2000 and 2010; and
1,405 cases (out of 7,177) between 2010 and 2017. Margaret E. McGuinness, U.S. Federal
Courts Asylum Cases Dataset of Citations to Country Reports (1980–2019) (dataset on file
with author). A review of the case law demonstrates the increased use of the reports over
time, as the reports expanded in depth and breadth of its coverage of country practices. A full
analysis of the Trump administration era has not been completed.
188. Judge Richard Posner has been a particular critic of the “overreliance” on the reports,
noting that they are “anonymous” and therefore restrict the ability of asylum seekers to crossexamine them, Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Gailius v. INS,
147 F.3d 34, 46 n.7 (1st Cir. 1998)), and expressing the “perennial concern that the Department
softpedals human rights violations by countries that the United States wants to have good
relations with.” Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997).
189. Thanks to Carlos Vasquez for this insight. Judicial estoppel generally refers to the
doctrine that a party may be estopped from arguing contradictory positions in different
proceedings. Here, the logic would be extended to prevent the Executive from arguing
contradictory positions regarding the human rights conditions in a particular country in: (1)
an inter-governmental report pursuant to statute, and (2) a later-in-time federal court
immigration proceeding.
190. The near-total deference by federal courts to the findings of these reports is not
always welcome by asylum advocates. See Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New
Procedural Perspective on America’s Asylum System, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 5 (2007)
(lamenting that “country conditions reports, regardless of their comprehensiveness or veracity,
may be fatal to an asylum application where those reports contradict the asylum seeker in
virtually any way”).
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in assessing human rights conditions in the country of origin.191 During that same time period in Australia, 510 reported cases cited the
State Department Country Reports in immigration claims.192 And at
least ninety-eight reported U.K. cases between 1990 and 2017 cited to
the reports.193 The process of taking judicial notice of facts from the
reports has the effect of transmogrifying an executive-congressional
reporting function, intended to serve as a mechanism of shared foreign
policymaking and oversight of foreign appropriations within the U.S.
government, to a set of documents with legal valence, used in the adjudication of human rights claims across a number of jurisdictions.194
E. Norm Integration Feedback Loop
From the beginning, the Country Reports have generally been
welcomed by local and international NGOs and human rights activists
working on the ground in states where government human rights
abuses have been criticized by the State Department.195 Likewise, they
have generally been unwelcome by the governments subject to the criticism.196 As part of the general critique that the United States filters
191. See Margaret E. McGuiness, Country Reports in Foreign Court Asylum Cases:
Canada, Australia, United Kingdom (dataset on file with author).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Additionally, the application of judicial notice to the reports is considered by some
an improper shift of judicial fact-finding from the courts to the State Department. Walker,
supra note 190, at 7, 7 n.51 (citing Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that “it was improper for the [Board of Immigration Appeals] to rely on the State Department’s
opinion in finding the petitioner not credible because it is the Attorney General, not the
Secretary of State, whom Congress has entrusted with the authority to grant asylum”) (internal
brackets and quotations omitted)).
195. For example, an April 19, 2006 cable from Embassy Freetown to the State
Department summarizing the reaction to the 2005 Country Report on Human Rights for Sierra
Leone noted that at a parliamentary forum on human rights, many individual and NGO
participants were “supportive of the report’s criticisms (especially women) . . . .” Sierra
Leoneans React to Human Rights Report, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 19, 2006), https://wikileaks.org/
plusd/cables/06FREETOWN322_a html [https://perma.cc/4Z4K-7UE9]. In contrast, “others,
especially the Attorney General [of Sierra Leone], expressed frustration at what they viewed
as unfair condemnation.” Id. Press coverage of the reports was generally supportive of the
conclusions and criticisms of the Sierra Leone government. Id.
196. The pushback and formal objection to the reports generally takes place in those
countries where there are serious human rights abuses and weak legal protections for claims
in the domestic legal system. One prominent example is China, which for the past decade has
issued an annual rebuttal to the U.S. Country Report, as well as a report on human rights
conditions in the U.S. The China report is called “The Human Rights Record of the United
States” and has been published as a rebuttal since 2003. See, e.g., Full Text of Human Rights
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out the worst abuses of its allies, NGOs and others criticize the ways
in which the reports fall short and fail to include practices that rise to
the level of violations of international human rights norms.197 Many
of the activists, NGOs, and local government officials who respond to
the reports are frequently also among the many first-person sources of
the embassy officials who draft the report.198 Thus, on the ground, the
reports are influenced by both local and international civil society perspectives on the rights situation in the particular country being monitored.199 The central reporting process, controlled at the State Department, is also subject to lobbying efforts by NGOs and broader civil
society, and, through the regional bureaus, the views of the governments that are the subjects of the reports.
The reports are thus part of a continual feedback cycle of human rights policy and norm elaboration.200 The reports have become
an entrenched part of international human rights law processes; at the
same time, they invoke the law and norms developed by the international human rights system to determine whether states are meeting
international human rights standards. Findings from U.S.-prepared
Record of the United States in 2010, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 10, 2011, 10:48 PM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20131029151313/http://news xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/
2011-04/10/c_13822287 htm [https://perma.cc/2CME-BA84].
197. For the shadow reports process, see LAWS.’ COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 169,
at 2–9.
198. Reporting is generally protective of local activists and NGOs, referring to them under
general descriptions, without naming them, while naming transnational NGOs that may be
protected from retaliation from the national government. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T STATE,
ALGERIA 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 36 (2016). Under the title “Press and Media
Freedoms,” the report states that “[a]ccording to the NGO Reporters without Borders, private
advertising existed but frequently came from businesses with close links to the ruling political
party.” Id. at 12. In the same section discussing others raising concerns about press freedoms, it
refers to “nongovernmental sources,” “activists and journalists,” and “[s]ome observers.” Id. at 12–
15.
199. The Foreign Affairs Manual contemplates the role of civil society in the work of the
DRL Bureau. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, 1 FOREIGN AFFS. MANUAL 512.1: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (DRL/PDAS) (2020) (“The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
meets with Congress, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector . . . .”);
U.S. DEP’T STATE, 1 FOREIGN AFFS. MANUAL 513: SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF LGBTI PERSONS (2020) (The Special Envoy for LGBTQI rights “[e]ngages in discussions
with foreign government officials and representatives of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) regarding the human rights of LGBTI persons”). See U.S. DEP’T STATE, 1 FOREIGN
AFFS. MANUAL 514: SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY (2020) for additional
references to requirements to work with NGOs and civil society. See also U.S. DEP’T STATE,
1 FOREIGN AFFS. MANUAL 516: BUREAU OFFICES (2020).
200. See Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political
Change, 45 WORLD POLS. 595, 597 (1993).
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human rights reports are cited in the work of international human rights
bodies, including courts, commissions, and treaty committees.201 They
are also used as sources in the reporting of the major international human rights NGOs.202 The reports prepared by international human
rights institutions and NGOs inform the monitoring and fact-finding
done by embassies and the DRL Bureau that serve as source material
for the Country Reports. In addition to gathering information from
local sources, embassy reporting officers are instructed to review and
cite to the work of international NGOs, regional and international human rights courts, and international human rights bodies.203 The U.S.
reporting process thus both informs and is informed by the process of
norm elaboration and application within international human rights institutions, domestic legal systems, and the networks of NGOs that
make up the international human rights system.
This feedback cycle also includes Congress, as evidenced in
subsequent statutory amendments that explicitly reference laws,
norms, and standards emerging from the UN and other international
human rights institutions.204 This entrenchment of the United States
as an active participant in international norm elaboration is quite remarkable for being an unintended consequence of the original legislation. In the next Part, I address the divergence of the monitoring and
reporting processes from the original purposes of the general
201. See Margaret E. McGuinness, International Human Rights Courts, Human Rights
Treaty Committees and Human Rights Commissions Citation to State Department Country
Reports (dataset on file with author).
202. See Margaret E. McGuinness, NGO Citation to State Department Country Reports
(2014) (dataset on file with author). See also Amnesty Int’l, Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle
of Violence AI Index AFR 44/043/2012 (Nov. 1, 2012) (citing U.S. DEP’T STATE, 2011
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – NIGERIA (2012)); Hum. Rts. Watch, Ten
Long Years: A Briefing on Eritrea’s Missing Political Prisoners (Sept. 22, 2011) (citing U.S.
DEP’T STATE, 2002 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – ERITREA (2003)),
https://www hrw.org/report/2011/09/22/ten-long-years/briefing-eritreas-missing-politicalprisoners [https://perma.cc/YM6G-675J].
203. See Margaret E. McGuinness, State Department Country Reports Citation to NGO
Reporting (dataset on file with author). See also Telegram from the Dep’t of State, supra note
155. This early instruction cable instructed posts to: “consult” reports by “responsible
[NGOs] such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the
International League of Human Rights,” as well as international organizations such as the
“Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Commission, the
European Human Rights Commission, the International Labor Organization, and UNESCO”
which “should be quoted when that is a good way to make a point.” Id. The instructions went
on to say that “[c]ountry reports will be compared with NGO and other reports, and we need
to be sure our reports take adequate account of what has been said in the other reports.” Id.
See also McGuinness, supra note 155.
204. See supra Part II for discussion of amendments to the statutory framework.
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mandates. I also draw preliminary conclusions about the future of U.S.
human rights reporting and its role in U.S. participation in international
human rights legal regimes. I also note the ways in which the record
of the congressional mandates suggests additional avenues for research
into understanding the role of human rights diplomacy in human rights
governance.
IV. THE STICKINESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING
The original purpose of congressional human rights legislation
was to apply the coercive power of the purse to halt U.S. government
support of regimes that engaged in severe human rights abuses and to
express support for human rights as a core element of U.S. foreign policy.205 As several scholars have noted, the general legislative framework set up by Congress was intended as a default sanctions mechanism⎯a “carrots and sticks” approach through which bad actors would
be punished by denials of U.S. assistance and good actors would be
rewarded.206 That original, general approach, which sought to impose
automatic cut-off of aid to states that did not meet the statutory standard of rights compliance, had little direct or immediate effect on U.S.
humanitarian or military aid practices.
First, the statutory waiver provisions, through which the President could override conditions on aid in cases of real economic need
or national security, delegated considerable authority to the executive
branch over ultimate funding decisions.207 During the Carter administration, for example, security assistance was cut off in only eight
cases, all in Latin America.208 Some of the cases were actually the
result of the foreign state rejecting human rights conditions attached to
the aid (as with early cases of Uruguay and Argentina); in other cases,
it was unclear whether the decision to cut off military assistance was
based solely on rights concerns, or some combination of other national
security interests, since neither Congress nor the President formally

205. See id.
206. See Cleveland, supra note 150, at 42–43; Carleton & Stohl, supra note 42, at 206–
07; Weissbrodt, supra note 43, at 241.
207. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 24–27 (discussing waiver provision of the
congressional mandates).
208. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 42, at 215–16.
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invoked the statutory triggers under the Foreign Assistance Act.209
Later presidential practices followed a similar pattern.210
Second, in response to the waiver exceptions in the general legislation, Congress has tended to adopt targeted legislation tailored to
the policy considerations and conditions in the particular aid-recipient
states whose behavior Congress has sought to punish, or, in the case of
non-aid recipient states, impose other forms of unilateral sanctions.211
As a result, there appears to be no evidence that an assistance package
requested has ever been denied solely on the basis of failing to meet
the human rights conditions laid out in the general human rights provisions of the foreign or military assistance statutes. Presidents, at the
end of the day, decided sanctions under the general provisions. Congress decoupled states of particular interest from the general monitoring and reporting provisions.
While human rights sanctions policy became decoupled from
human rights monitoring and reporting, academic attention focused on
the effectiveness of aid conditionality on improved human rights practices. Empirical studies completed in the 1980s and 1990s found that
Congress’s attempt to place human rights at the center of U.S. policy
through the general condition on aid failed to achieve the articulated
goal of limiting aid in cases of “gross violations” of rights.212 Following the adoption of the human rights conditionality and reporting requirements, aid generally continued to flow to friendly governments,
regardless of human rights practices.213 This was found to be the case
in both the Ford and Carter administrations, contrary to public perception and the purported focus of the Carter administration on human
rights behavior.214 Further, the countries for which the reporting
209. Id. at 216.
210. Meyer, supra note 111, at 91–92 (discussing Reagan administration).
211. For examples of country-specific targeted legislation, see McGuinness, supra note
16, at 22–23. For a discussion of the turn to targeting individuals as a form of sanction or
punishment within U.S. national security law, see Elena Chachko, Administrative National
Security, 108 GEO. L.J. 1063, 1077–78 (2020).
212. See discussion supra Section II.A.
213. Defining and measuring human rights compliance for the purpose of quantitative
analysis necessarily requires making a judgment on the content of international human rights
obligations. One early study concluded that aid tended to go to governments that were more
repressive, the opposite of what Congress intended. Lars Schoultz, U.S. Foreign Policy and
Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid
Distributions, 13 COMP. POL. 149, 167 (1981).
214. Michael Stohl et. al., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance from Nixon to
Carter, 21 J. PEACE RES., 215, 223–24 (1984). For a summary of the empirical studies of the
1980s, see Steven C. Poe, Human Rights and US Foreign Aid: A Review of Quantitative
Studies and Suggestions for Future Research, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 499, 502 (1990). Poe
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requirement was intended to support “constructive engagement” continued to be associated with bad human rights behavior.215
These studies were not without their criticisms, including the
subjective question of how to measure the dependent variable of “human rights compliance/noncompliance” as part of a quantitative empirical study.216 Nonetheless, the conclusions of these early studies,
that short-term policy and behavioral changes aimed at targeted states
had little to no effect on improving human rights practices, seem to
track general assessments, including of NGOs, regarding the human
rights record of states receiving U.S. aid. These studies did not, however, seek to measure the effect of congressional reporting requirements on norm internalization in the U.S. government (within the executive branch, Congress, or the courts), the long-term effects of the
mandates on the structures of diplomacy, or their effect on the growth
and development of international human rights law and governance.217
With reporting mandates decoupled from sanctions law and practices,
it is worth considering why Congress continually added to the reporting functions and burdens.
A. Not-so-“Cheap Talk”
Given the real costs of human rights reporting on U.S. foreign
policy resources, one might expect a Congress that is hostile to U.S.
participation in international human rights treaty regimes to take the
budget axe to human rights mandates. But the legislative history
shows a consistent pattern—through Democratic- and Republicancontrolled Congresses alike—of adding to reporting requirements and
expanding the number of diplomats designated to specific human
concludes that only one study found a positive correlation between human rights concerns and
actual policy effects. Id. at 500.
215. Cingranelli & Pasquarello, supra note 43, at 560–62.
216. See Poe, supra note 214, at 509–10. But see BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 11–12 (2009).

FOR

217. One exception is a qualitative empirical study completed by Ted Maynard and a
group of attorneys from the law firm Paul, Weiss in early 1989, which tracked the
developments within the human rights bureaucracy at the State Department through interviews
with former State Department officials. Edwin S. Maynard, The Bureaucracy and
Implementation of US Human Rights Policy, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 175, 219–24 (1989). It
described the institutionalization of a process of bureaucratic conformity with congressional
mandates. Id. This was true even within the Reagan administration, which had demonstrated
overt hostility to placing human rights on the foreign policy agenda. Id. at 224. This was
despite the Reagan administration’s “tracking” of countries reported on by categorizing them
as “friendly, neutral, or hostile.” Id.
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rights reporting duties.218 Even as the ideology of presidents has
swung from skepticism about human rights considerations to a full embrace of the centrality of human rights to U.S. interests and back again,
the State Department has consistently devoted resources to human
rights reporting and has taken seriously the work of drafting accurate
and comprehensive reports.219 What makes monitoring and reporting
“sticky”? Why have the mandates persisted?
The clearest answer to the persistence questions is that the
mandates may reflect a genuine expressive and aspirational commitment to the ideals of human rights, viewed through the lens of U.S.
politics.220 The persistence of the congressional mandates and their
full integration into the work of the executive branch may also lie, paradoxically, in the decoupling of the mandates from their original,
failed purpose to create general conditions on aid. The shift in purpose
allowed members of Congress to add issues to human rights reporting
coverage that helped them meet a domestic political constituency,
while incurring no political cost that might be associated with efforts
to actually constrain presidential foreign policy prerogatives. The
State Department and Congress were cognizant of the shift in purpose,
fully embracing the independent valence of the reports as a dimension
of human rights governance.221 The Country Reports stand apart and
on their own; they have transformed from an internal report from one
political branch to another for limited purposes of assessing compliance with statutory purposes, to a free-standing assessment by the
United States of global human rights conditions. The “submission” of
the annual Country Reports from the State Department to Congress has
become the global “publication” of the annual Country Reports.
The independent valence of the reports is displayed each spring
when the State Department, in anticipation of the impact of the reports,
coordinates the publication with embassies around the world and delivers a message conveying the American commitment to human rights
from the Secretary of State.222 States receiving low marks from the
218. Meyer, supra note 111, at 72–73; Sargent, supra note 39, at 136 (“[H]uman rights
made ideological claims to which both Republicans and Democrats could subscribe.”).
219. See id. See also Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110; Posner, supra note
175, at 412–13 (noting the work of the Lawyers’ Committee and other NGOs to engage with
the State Department in ways that improved accuracy and reliability of the Country Reports).
220. See discussion of the statutory origins supra Part II.
221. Interview with Senior Officials, supra note 110.
222. For an example of the pomp and circumstance of the rollout of reports, see Hillary
Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on the Release of the 2011 Human Rights
Report (May 24, 2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/05/
190826.htm [https://perma.cc/N88Z-XAB3]. The rhetorical shift in the Trump administration
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United States prepare for the date of publication with rebuttals (and, in
the case of China, with a counter-report, condemning the United States
for its own human rights shortcomings) and rhetorical defenses.223 The
act of contestation in the receiving states may itself be evidence of the
power of the report to engage the rights abusers on questions about
their own human rights practices. Moreover, there is some evidence
to suggest that the reports lend legitimacy to and embolden political
dissidents and human rights activists in reported-on states.224 The publication and reaction to the reports reveal that their impact is felt well
beyond Congress.
Decoupled as they now are from conditions on development
and military assistance, the Country Reports might, therefore, be dismissed as merely expressive “signaling,” permitting the United States
to express a commitment to human rights behavior in particular states,
while acting on other considerations when distributing assistance to
those very states. Statements by governments condemning—in moral
or legal terms—the conduct of others, without apparent policy consequences, have been dismissed by some scholars as precisely the kind
of “signaling” or “cheap talk” that falls far short of normative commitments particular to international law.225 But as Abram and Antonia
Chayes have argued, “jawboning” about other states’ behavior and
non-compliance with norms itself constitutes a form of management
within the international system, and should not be dismissed as mere

was to reframe the reporting within a particular lens of “unalienable rights,” but the reporting
itself continued as required by the CHRMs. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks
to the Press on the Release of the 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Mar. 11,
2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-on-the-release-of-the-2019country-reports-on-human-rights-practices//index html [https://perma.cc/529K-Q24Z].
223. See, e.g., Full Text of Human Rights Record of the United States in 2010, supra note
196.
224. Examples can be seen more generally in the role of civil society and NGOs in the
Universal Periodic Review Process at the UN Human Rights Council, which has created a
more formal mechanism for local and transnational NGO engagement directly with states.
See, e.g., Summary of Stakeholder Submissions on the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/WG.6/36/USA/3 (Mar. 6, 2020), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G20/062/28/PDF/G2006228.pdf?OpenElement [https://perma.cc/8L7A-7YDY].
225. For a comprehensive discussion of “signaling” and “cheap talk,” see Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational
Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115, S119 (2002). See also John O. McGinnis & Ilya
Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739,
1741 (2009); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 12–13, 59–60 (2008); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and
Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 689 (2008).
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“cheap talk.”226 Rather, the talk itself can affect the behavior of the
state being shamed, as well as the state doing the shaming. The reports,
separated from the underlying policy, have independent valence as a
device for shifting state behavior.227
B. Path Dependency and Reform
The international system of governance within which these
unilateral human rights reports operate has changed considerably since
the 1970s. In the intervening decades, the international human rights
regime has grown from infancy into adolescence. But it is not yet a
fully mature system. The human rights governance system is unwieldy
and sprawling but also incomplete. The system may be more effective
where there are regional arrangements⎯as in Europe and the Americas⎯than in those places with a weak or no regional system left to rely
on UN treaties or institutional mechanisms for oversight and enforcement. Nonetheless, despite recent declarations of the “end times,” the
international human rights project has progressed.228 This progress has
created multiple sources of outside scrutiny of particular states’ human
rights practices⎯including opportunities for binding adjudication and
enforcement of rights. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War,
there has been an expansion of states that incorporate the central human rights norms into their national constitutions and laws, opening
up additional avenues for applying international human rights law to
address claims at the domestic level.229 The jurisprudence of international human rights has grown apace.
Against this backdrop, unilateralism not only seems out of
place, but may, in fact, carry affirmative costs for the United States.
By aggressively pursuing unilateral judgment of foreign practices⎯while rejecting the same judgments on U.S. practices by remaining outside of treaties⎯the United States risks complete rejection, disengagement, and, in light of current human rights crises at

226. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 25–26 (1997).
227. For a full empirical examination of the effect of “naming and shaming” on state
human rights practices, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, supra note 225, at 689.
228. SIKKINK, supra note 14, at 26 (responding, comprehensively, to critics of the human
rights movement and noting that “human rights law, institutions, and movements have been
far more effective than they are often given credit for”).
229. Tom Ginsburg et al., Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National
Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 207–09.
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home, more resonant accusations of hypocrisy.230 The answer to these
critiques is not to remove human rights practices from the foreign policy agenda. Nor is the answer for a President to engage in ideological
or partisan projects to redefine the scope of rights to be considered.231
Indeed, the efforts by the Trump administration to redefine international human rights through the creation of the State Department Advisory Commission on Unalienable Rights, whose purpose was to assert a particular hierarchy of international human rights purportedly
rooted, like the congressional mandates, in the UHDR, is evidence that
the mandates have been successful in making the role of human rights
in U.S. foreign policy more durable. A more effective approach may
be to coordinate external human rights reporting more closely with the

230. Following the killing of George Floyd and the subsequent special session of the
United Nations Human Rights Council to consider police violence and race discrimination in
the United States in the summer of 2020, the charge of hypocrisy has grown louder. See Press
Release, Office of the High Commissioner, Statement on the Protests Against Systemic
Racism in the United States (June 5, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25927&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/9SNR-MN6A]; see also
Coalition Letter to Members of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Request for the
Convening of a Special Session on the Escalating Situation of Police Violence and Repression
of Protests in the United States (June 8, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/letter/coalition-letterrequest-un-independent-inquiry-escalating-situation-police-violence-and?redirect=
letter%2Fcoalition-letter-request-un-investigation-escalating-situation-police-violence-andrepression [https://perma.cc/9ZU9-7LHD] (requesting an independent inquiry into the
escalating situation of police violence and repression of protests in the United States)
[hereinafter June 8, 2020 Coalition Letter].
231. Caitlin Oprysko, Mike Pompeo Unveils Panel to Examine ‘Unalienable Rights,’
POLITICO, https://politi.co/2NGeCXA [https://perma.cc/5K6H-T6GC]. See U.S. DEP’T
STATE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON UNALIENABLE RIGHTS (2020), https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5ZS-UM2T]. For critiques and opposition to this report, see Rob
Berschinski & Reece Pelley, Why We Oppose the Pompeo Commission on Unalienable
Rights’ Draft Report, JUST SEC. (July 30, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71750/
why-we-oppose-the-pompeo-commission-on-unalienable-rights-draft-report/
[https://perma.cc/UDQ6-BR95]. In October 2020, the Trump administration signed the
Geneva Consensus Declaration, a declaration against women’s right to abortion, which
operates as a parallel effort to the Unalienable Rights Commission. It explicitly seeks to
contest the content of international law within the U.N. and its human rights institutions to
reflect the interpretive view of a particular administration. See Geneva Consensus Declaration
on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www hhs.gov/sites/default/files/geneva-consensus-declaration-english.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Y9K5-6AYD]; see also Alex M. Azar II, U.S. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
Michael Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony of the Geneva
Consensus Declaration (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeowith-secretary-alex-m-azar-ii-at-the-signing-ceremony-of-the-geneva-consensus-declaration/
[https://perma.cc/GV62-RSS4].
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reporting and oversight requirements of the international and regional
human rights treaty regimes and institutions.
The reporting demands on the State Department have become
quite onerous, with some reporting overlapping that of other agencies.
The State Department spends resources reporting on states that offer
robust legal human rights protection and who are parties to binding
supranational regional human rights regimes.232 It may be challenging, under current bureaucratic conditions, to create alternate means to
provide the information presented in the reports to other executive
branch agencies and courts that rely on them for decision-making. For
courts, the non-official alternatives to the State Department reports
(e.g., NGO, academic, and civil society reporting) lack the official imprimatur that enables courts to take formal judicial notice. Nonetheless, there are multilateral sources of human rights fact-finding that
could effectively substitute for at least some of the U.S. government
human rights reporting for courts and the executive branch.
As a result of joining the ICCPR, CERD, and CAT, albeit with
conditions, the United States monitors and reports on its own compliance with international human rights under those treaties’ periodic reporting requirements.233 When carried out on time and in good faith,
treaty self-reporting has the effect of further normalizing international
human rights discourse and language in the Department of Justice, in
the courts, and other parts of government previously unexposed to international human rights law. As a complement to the congressionally
mandated human rights reports, this process effectively internalizes
human rights as a necessary dimension of both U.S. internal and external behavior and the behavior of other states.
Gaps between the domestic and international, of course, persist. Despite the move toward human rights adoption at the state and
local level, and debates over the use of international human rights
norms in American constitutional jurisprudence notwithstanding, international human rights norms are not internalized as formal law governing domestic rights practices. Indeed, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to suggest it is moving in the opposite direction.234
232. U.S. DEP’T STATE, 2019 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2020),
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/
[https://perma.cc/39GU-5BY4].
233. See S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1990), https://www.congress.gov/treatydocument/100th-congress/20/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/4BJU-2CMK].
234. Recent Court decisions that effectively “shut the courthouse door” to extraterritorial
international human rights claims include cases in which the Court has: (1) limited the
extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,
569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013); and (2) narrowed the scope of personal jurisdiction over foreign
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But to the extent that policymakers can be made aware of the deep
influence that U.S. congressional mandates and executive branch practice have had on the development of international human rights law,
and the role they continue to play in human rights governance, adoption of the language of international human rights law into other aspects of domestic rights practice (including potential adoption of binding human rights treaty obligations) may not be such a large leap from
our “exceptional” rights traditions.
What once looked like unilateral human rights “exceptionalism”—under which the United States rationalized judging the human
rights behavior of foreign states but not itself—may be slowly eroding
as the United States subjects itself to international scrutiny of its rights
behavior at the UN and elsewhere. It may also be eroding because
U.S. behavior is increasingly scrutinized by the very human rights governance structures whose growth the United States has supported.235
As the domestic political rationales for and foreign acceptance of human rights exceptionalism wanes, the United States gains more from
active multilateral engagement in human rights than from continuing
to play a weakened role as unilateral global scold.
The governance story of the congressional human mandates
may suggest a path forward. First, they demonstrate that the executive
branch is well-integrated into the international human rights system
and continues to be well-placed to influence its direction. Second, the
effects of the mandates on international human rights governance also
suggest that there may be less daylight between how the U.S. reports
about the world’s human rights practices, and how, in the era of treaty
self-reporting and the Universal Periodic Review under the UN Human
Rights Council, it can (or should) report on itself.236 At least in terms
corporations liable for human rights abuses abroad, see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
119 (2014). Similar patterns can be seen in other efforts to apply international law to conduct
in the United States, where the Court has: (1) limited the application of international law in
interpretation of treaty implementing statutes, see Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 846
(2014); and (2) rejected as non-self-executing, international judgments that seek review of
capital sentences, see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 (2008).
235. This trend had begun before the Trump administration but has accelerated during it.
For example, the 2020 UN Human Rights Council special session convened to address police
violence and anti-Black discrimination in the United States. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Human
Rights Council Begins Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26102&LangI
D=E [https://perma.cc/42HC-L5ZW]. See also Statement on the Protests Against Systemic
Racism in the United States, supra note 230.
236. See, e.g., United States, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph
5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/22/
USA/1 (Feb. 13, 2015) (incorporating the language of international human rights into the U.S.
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of practice of the two political branches, there is an opportunity for
convergence between the U.S. reporting on its own and others’ rights
practices using the universal language of international human rights
law.
C. Human Rights Diplomacy: An Agenda for Research
This Article is intended to provide both a positive account of
the operation of the congressional human rights mandates as a mechanism for norm integration in the U.S. government, and of their operation as a form of international human rights governance. As such, it
makes no claim about the effect of those norms on human rights conditions, but rather serves to illustrate the influence of human rights diplomacy in defining and elaborating on those norms. The processes of
contestation over the content of the norms at the center of U.S. human
rights diplomacy⎯internally with U.S. domestic politics and externally with bilateral and multilateral governance⎯is the subject of
some attention from historians, political scientists, and legal scholars.
By making more visible the role of diplomacy in the construction and
interpretation of human rights norms and institutional governance, I
hope to suggest additional avenues of research for understanding how
international human rights law works. These include a more finegrained understanding of the content of the human rights norms at the
center of U.S. human rights diplomacy, how those norms have evolved
over time, and the degree of influence of those normative frameworks
on the development of international human rights law. Understanding
how human rights monitoring and reporting contributes to customary
international law raises additional questions regarding the social practice of international human rights diplomacy in law creation.
Identification of the use of the U.S. human rights reports in a
myriad of adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory settings raises important
questions about their reliability and admissibility for purposes of determining factual and legal claims. These questions apply to other human rights reporting processes and their uses in a particular legal fora.
report: “As a nation founded on the human rights principles of equality under the law and
respect for the dignity of the individual, the United States is firmly dedicated to the promotion
of human rights.”). But see United States, National Report Submitted in Accordance with
Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21, 3, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/WG.6/36/USA/1 (Aug. 13, 2020) (framing U.S. human rights practices within a
particular interpretation of the U.S. Constitution: “The United States of America is a
compound federal republic, in which the power entrusted to government by our people is first
divided between two distinct governments [federal and state], and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Closer examination of the processes and methods of U.S. human rights
reporting will be an important contribution to the growing scholarship
around human rights fact-finding, including critiques of the use of data
and “human rights indicators.”237 Providing greater transparency
about standards applied to fact-finding and legal determinations is important for purposes of determining due process and separation of
powers questions within U.S. constitutional law.238 Such transparency
is also important for determining international due process and accuracy questions within international human rights governance. Most
important, it can inform debates over measuring the effectiveness of
human rights governance over state human rights practices.
Finally, the influence of unilateral human rights mandates as a
form of governance raises a persistent legitimacy challenge to international human rights governance, which is worth examining: the question of “clean hands.” The United States has been steadily criticized
for judging others, when its own record of human rights protection is
less than perfect.239 The problem of judging rights with unclean hands
has led to calls for the United States to focus on problems at home and
abandon the project of human rights diplomacy.240 Similar questions
haunt human rights governance at the United Nations, where states
with records of gross human rights violations are viewed as illegitimate arbiters of human rights compliance.241 The international human
237. For a summary of the move toward human rights indicators within the international
human rights system, see David McGrogan, Human Rights Indicators and the Sovereignty of
Technique, 27 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 385, 387–91 (2016). See also United Nations, Human Rights
Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation (2012), https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UBH-MEZA].
238. Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 872–99 (2019)
(examining how internal executive branch structures, congressional regulation, and judicial
review may be deployed to ensure that presidential fact-finding ensures that the constitutional
duties of “honesty” and “reasonable inquiry” are met).
239. Ignatieff, supra note 10, at 1, 4–7.
politicization supra Section III.C.

See also the discussion of accuracy and

240. See, e.g., Kelebogile Zvobgo, Foreign Policy Begins at Home, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan.
15, 2021, 10:19 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/human-rights-foreign-policydomestic/ [https://perma.cc/HGN9-K4QA] (calling on the creation of transitional justice
mechanisms to address the human rights problems of the Trump era); David Kaye, America
the Unexceptional, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 10, 2020, 4:57 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/
06/10/american-exceptionalism-human-rights-democracy-unexceptional/ [https://perma.cc/
6F7V-9F2X] (arguing for full U.S. membership in and implementation of human rights
treaties to address human rights problems at home as a predicate for human rights leadership).
241. Philip Alston, Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting
the New UN Human Rights Council Feature, 7 MELB. J. INT’L L. 185, 185 (2006) (proposing
criteria for membership of the then-new UNHCR that is “genuinely supportive of its human
rights objectives”); UN: Deny Rights Council Seats to Major Violators, HUM. RTS. WATCH
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rights system has been premised on states’ commitment to improvement of behavior, against the norms articulated and elaborated through
interstate processes. Participation in human rights governance does
not require perfection, but rather perfectibility. Yet, in order for international human rights institutions to live up to the highest ideals of
universal state protections of individual human rights, some standards
about who monitors and reports human rights, and how they do so, is
warranted. Unilateral assertions of U.S. exceptionalism and the exercise of the prerogatives of global power may not be sufficient to warrant unchallenged claims of legitimacy.

(Oct. 8, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www hrw.org/news/2020/10/08/un-deny-rights-councilseats-major-violators [https://perma.cc/64B2-UDVL].
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APPENDIX: ANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

Title of Report
Country
Reports on
Human Rights
Practices

Content

Statutory
Requirement
The Secretary of
Sections
State shall
116(d) and
transmit to the
502B(b) of the
Speaker of the
Foreign
House of
Assistance Act
Representatives
of 1961
and the
(“FAA”), as
Committee on
amended, and
Foreign Relations section 504 of
of the Senate “a
the Trade Act
full and complete of 1974, as
report regarding
amended.
the status of
Codified in 22
internationally
U.S.C. § 2304
recognized human and §2151(n).
rights, within the
meaning of
subsection (A) in
countries that
receive assistance
under this part,
and (B) in all
other foreign
countries which
are members of
the United
Nations.
The reports cover
internationally
recognized
individual, civil,
political, and
worker rights, as
set forth in the
Universal
Declaration of
Human Rights.

Transmit by:
Feb. 25
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International
Religious
Freedom

Victims of
Trafficking
and Violence
Protection Act
of 2000
Annual Report
on Advancing
Freedom and
Democracy242

Status of religious
freedom in each
foreign country,
government
policies violating
religious belief,
and practices of
groups, religious
denominations,
and individuals,
and U.S. policies
to promote
religious freedom
around the world.
Secretary of State
submits the
annual report to
Congress on
“severe forms of
trafficking in
persons.”
State Dept.
submits report on
U.S. efforts to
promote
democracy and
human rights in
nondemocratic
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Section 102(b)
of the
International
Religious
Freedom Act
(“IRFA”) of
1998.
Codified in 22
U.S.C. § 6412.

Sept. 1

Originated in
TVPA 2000,
codified at 22
U.S.C. § 7107.

June 1

Pursuant to
Section 2121
of the
ADVANCE
Democracy
Act of 2007 (P.
L. 110-53).243

No later than
ninety days
after submission
of the Country
Reports on
Human Rights

242. “The Annual Report on Advancing Freedom and Democracy shall include, as
appropriate –
(1) United States priorities for the promotion of democracy and the protection of
human rights for each nondemocratic country and democratic transition country,
developed in consultation with relevant parties in such countries; and
(2) specific actions and activities of chiefs of missions and other United States
officials to promote democracy and protect human rights in each country.
22 U.S.C. § 8221.
“The Department chose the 106 countries represented after taking into consideration
the Act’s definition of a ‘non-democratic country or democratic transition country’ and the
requirement that the Department take into account the views of nongovernmental organizations.” U.S. DEP’T STATE, ADVANCING FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY REPORT 2009 – WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/afdr/2008/wha/index htm [https://perma.cc/
934X-YDQH].
243. Title as enacted, “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007,” incorporates provisions from the earlier ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007, H.R.
982, that was wiped off calendar at end of session.
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countries and
countries
undergoing
democratic
transitions
worldwide.
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